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Abstract: 
 
             The strength and dominance of political society, rather than the weaknesses of 
civil society, is arguably one of the primary reasons for massive civil uprising in Egypt 
led by independent, unaffiliated members of society. In many cases it appears that civil 
society was behind the Egyptian Revolution, although is this the case? Did the 
Revolution happen in spite of civil society? Just as the state can be a roadblock to 
development and democratization, civil society may also be detrimental to society’s 
growth. In this thesis, the development and civil society community is analyzed to 
discover the functions of CSOs as well as their own opinions on civil society in the hope 
of gaining a more precise and practical understanding of civil society’s role throughout 
Egypt. This thesis considers the major forces of civil society, both externally and 
internally, to include: local NGOs, international NGOs, USAID, development 
contractors, transnational organizations, and youth members of the resistance movement 
known throughout this research as “activists.”  
             Development agencies and foreign governments fund civil society in order to 
promote democratization and empower actors outside of the state. However there is a 
lack of understanding of what civil society is in the developing context rather than how it 
is understood in Western academia and policy. In the developing context civil society is 
often not simply a grassroots sector, as is often suggested, and rather an intricate network 
of transnational organizations funded by foreign governments or WB and IMF, while 
local organizations or NGOs are highly regulated by national government. Essentially 
these formal civil society organizations are unable to challenge state dominance due to 
the fact that they either work closely with them or are working or the goals of Western 
global structures. What the investigative research found is that there is a dynamic, 
grassroots, and voluntary group of unaffiliated members of society although they’re not 
considered to be civil society by national or foreign governments, and therefore do not 
receive funding or assistance like formal civil society. This research and thesis is vital to 
the understanding of what civil society is in Egypt and the re-conceptualization of civil 
society in the developing world.   
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To Midan Tahrir and Beyond 
 
The Twitterverse on #Jan25: 
 
@SandMonkey: Shower, Cargo pants, Hoodie, running shoes, phone charged, cash, ID, 
cigs (for jail) and some mace just in case. Am ready! #Jan25 
 
@adamakary: #jan25 protester’s demands: increase in minimum wage, dismissal of 
interior ministry, removal of emergency law, shorten presidential term 
 
@Sarahngb: Tahrir square looks scary. Cordons, policemen, fire trucks, CS trucks. 
#Jan25 
 
@tarekshalaby: Today’s our day as #CitizenJournalists to cover and share the truth 
freely. Regardless of the outcome we are winners cuz we’re a team #jan25 
 
@monasosh: I know this will sound corny, but I have never felt like this is my country 
more than now #jan25 
 
@Ghonim: We got brutally beaten up by police people @Jan25 
 
@ashrafkhalil: #Jan25 crowd chanting ‘salmeya’ peaceful 
 
@RamyYaacoub: RT @Sarahngb: Thousands of People still at tahrir square chanting ‘al 
sha3b yoreed esqat el nizam’ ‘the people want the system down’ 
 
@Ghonim: Egypt after #Jan25 is no way going to be the same as Egypt before it. Today 
we proved so many points. 
 
It was the 1st of February 2011 in the late evening. Wearing a galabeya, a 
traditional white robe, I awaited anxiously, sitting on my back porch in San Francisco, 
California. Having just arrived from Cairo two days before the first day of the uprising, I 
was already considering my next flight back. I figured that the final semester of 
university could wait. Glued to my laptop, staring at the ensuing events, I tried to stay in 
close contact with friends and family. Personally, this was a bittersweet time; I felt that I 
needed to be there on multiple fronts, particularly for my family’s safety as well as to join 
the movement. My family had never cared for military rule or the Mubarak regime but 
had become disenchanted, or jaded, over time and had no intention of flying me in for 
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“another flattened protest.” Keeping in close contact is what allowed me to mentally or 
spiritually take part, spread awareness in the U.S. (where almost everyone was beyond 
confused), and take part in the growing international protests in solidarity with the people 
of the so called Arab Spring. I was not present in Cairo during the initial eighteen days of 
the uprising, however, I was in the capital for the one-year anniversary as well as spent 
several months in Cairo throughout the year of 2012. As a consequence, I only have the 
personal accounts of close friends and family members that took part in the eighteen-day 
uprising. 
As I begin to recall, it was the early morning of February 1st, 2011 in Cairo, 
Egypt. The passing month was imprinted onto the minds of every Egyptian as if it were 
yesterday. Exhausted from many sleepless nights, we were weary of a security apparatus 
of which we feared our entire lives. Buzzing from a constant nerve-racking excitement 
that was going on outside our apartments, there was a tension thick enough that it could 
have been sliced with a knife. Fearful of the next twenty minutes (let alone what the 
future had in store) there was nonetheless also a feeling of pride, a feeling of 
accomplishment beyond what any student, manual laborer, banker, engineer, or 
unemployed person has ever felt before.  This feeling was not related to personal deeds 
that only you or your immediate family could reap the benefits; this was instead a feeling 
of energetic waves circulating through millions of people with the hope of accomplishing 
something greater than their immediate circle and beyond themselves, something that 
could (and will) alter the course of Egyptian history. This same energy awoke the restless 
youth, many wondering if they could keep this momentum going for at least one more 
day.  
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At the beginning of each day, it has become typical for the daily mode of thinking 
to become more serious as people spend time sifting through social media and news 
(local and international). Using Facebook and/or Twitter, the situation is analyzed: Who 
was there? What were protesters seeing and hearing? (It was the “go-to” primary news 
source). Of course, a week after the beginning of the uprising, the government blocked 
social media outlets forcing media users (even the average technologically-capable 
individuals) to take advantage of proxy Facebook and Twitter sites. Other thoughts 
included: How are we going to get to Tahrir? What is security like? Where will everyone 
meet? How will we get home? (And of course, the question on many people’s minds 
particularly for the majority who did not spend their nights guarding the square) What in 
God’s name am I going to wear? This question may sound irrelevant, but it was just as 
important as any other. In other words, what do you wear to protect yourself from police- 
baton beatings and massive over-crowding or from tear gas and rubber bullets? These 
were practical thoughts by the practical revolutionary when considering all the 
possibilities of “What can happen today?” and “How can we come out alive in order to 
sustain this growing movement?” 
In Cairo, Tahrir Square is the place to be. It is a central-blood conduit for reaching 
Cairo’s city center, downtown, Mohandeseen, Zamalek, Heliopolis, Maadi, Shubra, and 
other areas. Diverse crowds battle from every neighborhood to break police barriers 
while wiggling themselves through narrow roads that barely have enough space for a 
1980 Fiat, let alone the infamous police “box” truck. Tahrir works as the destination for 
every group march or massive protest, not simply because the square is coincidentally 
named liberation square in English, but because it is a public space and therefore it can 
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hold mass crowds coming in from every surrounding neighborhood; it effects traffic 
because it is located near luxurious hotels and the Cairo Museum (for example) that 
makes it easy to disturb much of the city’s flow of transportation and tourism; and 
because the Square symbolizes the heart of Cairo where crowds offer protection for the 
resting revolutionaries who had occupied the square and established a tent city. Tahrir has 
now become a microcosm of Egypt, albeit a bohemia, but still a fair representation of 
Egypt’s urban youth as well as older generations of men and women. 
At this point (February 1st) in the Square, receiving cell phone signals and/or 
communication was nearly impossible. Upon arrival to Tahrir one would find civilian 
checkpoints (for safety reasons and to ensure the peaceful attitude of the protests) 
surrounding the general area and specifically guarding the entrances and exits around the 
square.  Along with civilian security came many welcoming people tempting those on the 
outskirts to join and be a part of what was happening. Separate lines were formed for men 
and women that worked toward ensuring a safe experience for all. Anyone who has lived 
or visited Egypt will know how rare ordered lines are, for any establishment. The people 
in Tahrir are trying to make a point or send a message not just about how non-violent 
protesting should be conducted, but also how a crowd of thousands can be well-organized 
and civilized, unlike the wild, adrenaline junkie, anarchists the state media had portrayed 
them as. Although checkpoints can be seen as threatening, particularly for this police 
state, in reality civilian checkpoints are not nearly as threatening because everyone is on 
the same “side;” guards even made a point to be kind and courteous during each pat 
down. 
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Once going passed the checkpoint, your imagination was opened to the 
unexpected. Everything looked unfamiliar and unrecognizable to the point that, if it were 
not for the well known surrounding sites of the Cairo Museum and KFC (for example), 
you would hardly recognize where you were or be able to orient yourself. The square was 
packed, beyond anything resembling a fair or carnival. Public space was occupied. The 
main square of downtown, normally an orientalist dream or at least a tourist’s favorite 
open space amidst the bustling crowded city, was now out of service for its conventional 
duties, it felt as if you just passed through an entirely different city in order to get to 
Tahrir Square. Yet, it was not the site itself that was jaw dropping, but in fact it was the 
people. The crowds of people were actively and composed of mostly young individuals 
but all with different backgrounds (conservative and progressive, secular and religious); it 
did not matter. All that mattered was that people cooperated with one another in order to 
achieve what had been seen as an impossible feat in the past.  
Somehow individuals knew how to organize for this movement. People had no 
problems giving orders as much as taking orders. The surrounding space was so clean 
you may have thought you were in Tahrir Square in 1927. Within the Square, midan, 
there were hospital tents, tents for sleeping, tents for making posters, with people of 
different ethnicities around them. Venders (no officially recognizable until several weeks 
later) sold flags, protester paraphernalia (for example, gas masks for the purpose of 
protection from tear gas) food, and water. In some cases food and water were simply 
handed out for free to anyone who was thirsty or hungry. There was a real sense of 
camaraderie, no matter what your religion, sex, or age was and that is something 
Egyptians had never felt on a mass scale before (beyond his or her own neighborhood). It 
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is as if our generation had awoken from a three-decade slumber ready to build a future, 
ready to take the situation into their own hands, ready to reclaim their individual and 
collective rights, and ready to make the mark on society that they had yet to make. As 
soon as one person managed to lock eyes with someone else, there was an exchanged 
gesture that signaled a need for help with a chore such as cleaning up trash if handed a 
trash bag or delivering medical supplies to tents or simply to hoist a flag or poster if 
given. 
Furthermore, there were sounds of chanting and loud yells in a rhythmic chorus 
coming from open mouths of ordinary, modest people. Women, who are rarely allowed to 
show their dissatisfaction with their traditional gender role created by the state, were seen 
leading chants and putting their hearts and souls into their words. Men, denying their 
traditional roles, were seen leading but also, going against the expectation of men’s roles 
in society, were following chants, taking the back seat to other leaders, and for once 
allowing women to play the integral role that they are normally limited to in a highly-
patriarchal society.  Moreover, Muslims and Christians were raised together garnering 
Bibles and Qurans to demonstrate the community’s cohesiveness and togetherness. The 
crowds, similar to what was seen in Tunisia, often yelled “we are one hand,” “down with 
the regime,” and “down with military rule” while in between the hallmark chants came 
witty, creative, rhyming phrases that displayed Egypt’s world renowned sense of humor. 
Smiles and sadness, chants and conversation, everyone had their personal reasons for 
being present at the protest, yet the underlying force was to take back their country, 
together. 
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Recalling further, I pushed my way through the crowds as a feeling of 
claustrophobia came over me while the faces of different walks of life passed. 
Approaching the epicenter of the Square, I squeezed behind the tea vendor (who was 
excitedly yelling in Arabic, “Tea, Tea, have a cup for Egypt”) to climb a ledge and 
improve my vantage point. With just a few more feet of elevation I was able to better 
differentiate who was who within this microcosm of Egypt. Whether it were young, 
urban, middle-class men chanting creative cheers in rhymes or a group of women, half-
veiled half-not, calling for their equal rights within the new constitution or bearded men 
congregating on a colorful stage with loud speakers promoting the Islamist political 
agenda, one key conclusion was obvious: No one knew what they were doing. For almost 
all who were in attendance, the past year was the first time for many Egyptians to bask in 
the fight for the human right of freedom and of political speech.   
 Fast-forwarding to the summer of 2012 (September to be precise) Egypt had a 
democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi. Not coincidentally, he is the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) candidate from the Freedom and Justice party. The MB, 
(banned for decades up until this Revolution) played a solid, yet dominatingly active role 
in the uprising, making sure their presence was felt in Tahrir Square and elsewhere. It just 
so happens now that their candidate is our current President (something I had mulled 
about and was initially confused about when they were passing around political pins 
throughout Tahrir months before even a decision to have an election). The foundation of 
Tahrir, its cohesiveness, is barely intact and I cannot help but wonder if this was the 
result of its politicization. I keep asking myself, were the Egyptians in Tahrir Square and 
in other city centers of Egypt playing the role of civil society? Or did the Square become 
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a place to enhance political agendas?  If the Square has changed over time, how and why 
did it happen and can we actually call it civil society? And really, what is civil society in 
Egypt? What are these social and political dynamics of Egyptian civil society that allows 
our society to be confused and unaware of who is with whom? And so, I went back to 
Cairo, in search of these difficult answers, interested to know what kind of role major 
forces of civil society were playing in the uprising, and whether they are the same people 
who were in the Square just a year earlier lining up side by side, with arms ringed 
together, and in unison chanting: “Down with the military dictatorship.” 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  Egypt has, and always will be, the subject of a variety of interpretations of 
history, politics, and culture. This is especially the case considering that Egyptian society 
is seven-millennia old and is at the crossroads of the African and Asian continent. 
Whether one ponders about the construction of the great Pyramids of Giza or the many 
stories surrounding the three Abrahamic faiths, Egypt has reserved its place in the history 
of human development. As an Egyptian American, this country is my home because it is 
where I was born and where I lived until I was eighteen. I was raised with ancient 
Christian and Islamic Egyptian histories since childhood. Of course, I never fully realized 
the geo-political significance of my home and I certainly never grew up looking at the 
country through an anthropologic lens. Arguably, I still do not. Yet there I was, January 
25th 2011, nearly finished with my undergraduate degree, not knowing I would be 
recalling this memory for my master’s thesis, and I was watching what would quickly 
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become the Egyptian Revolution on my laptop from the sunny porch of a shared 
apartment in San Francisco.   
My initial reaction quickly discredited the relevance of civil resistance and 
protest, putting it down to an increasingly lower standard of living for most Egyptians. 
From the millennium to 2010, the decade was marked by a flurry of protests that called 
for increased individual rights but were quickly squashed. A few days later, the 
movement grew, and the majority of people gathered in Tahrir (liberation) Square were 
protesting against President Hosni Mubarak and his cabinet, which had held on to power 
for thirty years.  To witness the socio-political eruption through the Western news 
stations, yet to be far away and to hear the chanting through my computer the whole 
situation was surreal on a number of levels. In my gut, it felt impossible that the President 
Mubarak, who has been hailed as the Pharaoh, the Father, the great leader who has 
“provided” peace with Israel, would allow himself to be seen as an enemy of the people. 
Yet for all of this, the calls for protest were not that surprising on many levels: Egypt had 
been in a political and economic downturn for a decade while it implemented neo-liberal 
policies that caused the quality of life for a majority of Egyptians to decrease.   
 One year later, after a thousand Egyptian deaths, even more injuries, supposed 
sectarian violence, state sponsored violence, the ousting of Hosni Mubarak along with the 
National Democratic Party (the one party that has ruled Egypt), and the state continues to 
be in disarray. I found myself attending the one-year anniversary of the Revolution in the 
epicenter of Cairo, Tahrir Square.  Nearly one million strong in the country’s capital and 
the Revolution felt all but finished. The choking smell of teargas was not there to torment 
civilians. The images of police and military were non-existent. The passionate, 
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revolutionary spirit felt fresh, almost as if I had never left for the U.S. to study the year 
prior to the outbreak.  
While some individuals and groups treated the day as a time to celebrate, many 
felt that the trials and tribulations of Egyptian citizens were beginning to seem like a lost 
cause, as if the Revolution had not been realized. Besides the ousting of Mubarak and 
members of his authoritarian regime, they were quite correct, much had gone unchanged. 
Pushing my way through the crowds, and feeling claustrophobic, the faces of many 
different walks of life passed. Approaching the epicenter of the Square I squeezed behind 
the tea vendor, who was excitedly yelling in Arabic, “Tea, Tea, have a cup for Egypt.” I 
climbed a ledge to improve my vantage point. With just a few more feet of elevation I 
was able to better differentiate who was who within the microcosm of Egypt that was 
Tahrir Square. Whether it were young, urban, middle class kids chanting creative cheers 
in rhymes or a group of women, half veiled half not, calling for their equal rights within 
the new constitution or bearded men congregating on a colorful stage with loud speakers 
promoting the Islamist political agenda, one key conclusion was obvious: No one knew 
what they were doing. For almost all who were in attendance, the past year was the first 
time for many Egyptians to bask in the human right of freedom of political speech.  Yet, 
with the new in coming freshness of political freedom came skepticism that took time for 
most Egyptians to accustom themselves.  
Watching, listening, and joining with individuals and groups conversing, sharing 
active dialogue, enthusiastically conveying frustration on their faces and hands, it was 
clear that most shared similar general inquiries that friends, family, and I had on our 
minds: Who will lead Egypt next? What does the future hold?  How will the country be 
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governed with a bloated bureaucracy; high unemployment; and without strong 
institutions, government, civil society and other key factors of a fully functioning state? 
The Egyptian military that runs a significant portion of the economy is known as the 
government’s armed wing; it quickly took the role of leader and stabilizer in order to 
oversee the transitional and election period that approached in the summer of 2012 and 
now is in charge of the state. For a country that was once considered by global financial 
institutions to be semi-stable, on the rise, and with a GDP growth rate of up to six and 
seven percent in the last decade, the conditions of the state are unnerving, if not bleak. 
The basis of this research is to determine what kind of state Egypt is, post-revolution, and 
what societal forces have a stake in filling the power vacuum left behind by the former 
thirty-year president in order to ultimately decipher what and who compose Egyptian 
civil society.  
            The key elements of this puzzle require an unraveling of the relationship between 
the state, political society, and civil society. First this means analyzing what “the state” is 
both theoretically and practically. For Egypt, understanding the state is a complex task. 
The distinguishing lines between political and civil society are unclear as certain social 
forces play a dual role. In the Egyptian case, political society is made up of the military, 
the government led by the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and 
Justice Party, the state’s security forces, and a plethora of newly founded or revitalized 
political parties yearning for a seat, or representation, in the recently elected parliament. 
The most relevant force within political society, besides the military, is the newly de-
legalized, extremely organized, Islamic based political party: the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) or the Ikhwan. The state, in this case, is a tool for cultural and political coercion 
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used by the ruling party, known up until now as the military and the newly elected 
government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Civil society in Western academic 
literature cites civil society as a democratic, grassroots sector of the nation-state, 
providing Western governments the inspiration for writing policy that supports civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in developing nations. Still, is this definition misconstrued 
or misinterpreted, when civil society in Egypt does not appear in the same light? In order 
to achieve cultural and political dominance, civil society can also be used as a tool for 
cultural and political coercion. The strength and dominance of political society, rather 
than the weaknesses of civil society, are seen as primary reasons for massive civil 
uprising led by independent, non-affiliated members of society. Just as the state can be a 
roadblock to development and democratization, however, civil society forces may also be 
detrimental to society’s growth. In this thesis, the development and civil society 
community is analyzed to discover the functions of CSOs as well as their own opinions 
on civil society in the hope of gaining a more precise and practical understanding of civil 
society’s role throughout Egypt. The claim made in this thesis considers the major forces 
of civil society, both externally and internally, to include: local NGOs, international 
NGOs, USAID, development contractors, transnational organizations, and youth 
members of the resistance movement known throughout this research as the “activists.”  
               After investigative research, it has been determined that the needs, functions, 
and dynamics of the major forces (or social groups) make up the state of Egypt. It is, I 
argue, especially important to understand who the agents of power are in this tumultuous 
time, particularly within the context of this movement against the former regime. Are 
civil society organizations (CSOs) the groups that organized the Revolution or did the 
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Revolution occur in spite of civil society? The purpose of the Revolution was not only to 
alter the status quo, but also to recreate, reestablish, and remodel the plan for Egypt’s 
growth as a developed state and society. Under Mubarak, there was no such plan. While 
it may have appeared this way on paper, with Egypt receiving the second highest amount 
of U.S. foreign aid, the country functioned under a patronage system that cared for the 
interests of those in power. While civil society is meant to challenge this system, CSOs 
have functioned under the dictatorship and many arguably are either not capable or are 
not interested in applying pressure on government. This research and thesis is vital to the 
understanding of what civil society is in Egypt in an attempt to distinguish between the 
various social forces of the state, and whether they actually conduct the work of civil 
society in principle.  
The plan of this thesis is as follows: First a historical overview and backdrop of 
contemporary Egypt leading up to the beginning of the Revolution will be provided. The 
literature review will magnify the varying interpretations of the state, its function, and 
what it is should be projected as in the case of Egypt. Second, the root and many 
meanings of civil society will be put in to context in order to better conceptualize its role 
in Egypt’s society in reality. Following, the methodology will include an outline of the 
description of sample subjects, access to subjects, the recruitment procedure, the subject 
consent process, the positives and limitations of my research, as well as the potential risks 
and benefits to research subjects. The following sections will analyze the primary 
research and political cartoons from post-Revolution, followed by the discussion chapter.  
I will present the research and interview results completed during my stay in Egypt while 
the discussion will be utilized for delving into the research more deeply. 
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Historical Overview of Contemporary Egypt 
 
 The nation-state of Egypt, also known as the Arab Republic of Egypt, is located in 
northeastern Africa and is home to the largest population in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). Being a transcontinental nation1 Egypt, in the modern world, had been 
as a leader of political, economic, and social movements throughout the region. With a 
vast historical background, ancient languages and religions, it is particularly interesting-
and puzzling as to why Egypt has in the last three decades followed a downward spiral of 
political, economic, and social erosion. With the great pyramids and pharaohs in Egypt's 
rearview mirror, the once prosperous nation is now at a crucial fork in the road in 2012.  
Just this past year, January 2011, Egypt underwent a revolution that attempted to throw 
out the ruling party and president, Hosni Mubarak, after nearly thirty years of "almost 
democratic" authoritarian rule.  Beginning with a brief history of how the state of Egypt 
has come to be, this section will attempt to outline the logic in which the leading party, 
the military, The National Democratic Party (NDP), and its president, has controlled the 
political, social and economic spheres of life throughout the country in order to keep 
itself at the forefront of power. 
 
Egypt in the Modern world 
 
 Before the modern world and birth of the Republic of Egypt the region became 
home to many notable colonizers, giving way to the Greek, Roman, Arab, Ottoman, 
French and British empires. Egypt's relationship with the international community had 
                                                        
1 Egypt geographically resides both on the northeastern corner of the African 
continental shelf and the Asian continent.  
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always been one of dependence until the early 20th century2.  Following the First World 
War, Saad Zaghlul and the Wafd party led the first Egyptian nationalist movement of 
their modern history in an attempt to revolt against the British Empire. Though the 
British government issued a unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922, the 
replacement kingdom under King Farouk would rule for decades of autocratic and 
neocolonial rule. Britain's continued military involvement along with the King Farouk's 
constant involvement in the parliament led to a 1952 coup de tat or military revolution, 
depending on whom you speak to. What some consider to be a revolution can also be 
understood as a bloodless coup led by the Free Officers Movement led by the top youth 
military leaders: Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar El Sadat. This 
change in power would open the doorway to an Egyptian led Egypt for the first time in 
thousands of years, a period of modern Egyptian history mired with extreme highs and 
lows, and a newly politicized military junta leadership that has ruled Egypt to this day. 
 General Muhammed Naguib became the first president of Egypt while also 
                                                        
2 Egypt’s historical character has many faces due to their extensive colonial background. 
Egypt has failed to be ruled by its own people dating back to Ancient Egypt. Prior to the 
mid-twentieth century, imperial powers in Egypt consisted of British, French, Ottoman, 
Arab, Roman, and Greek/Macedonian rulers.  Under the Ptolemaic and Roman era Egypt 
was utilized as an agricultural breadbasket for the Mediterranean powers. Throughout the 
middle ages, and as a result of the spread of Islam, various Arab rulers ruled Egypt 
particularly the Fatimid and Mamluk empires. The early modern era gave way to 
Ottoman and French rule who were keen on controlling Eastern trade routes. Ottoman 
rule lasted from 1517 to 1882 though the French occupied Egypt for a short time. The 
region acted as an important Ottoman governorate though on several attempts were made 
to become autonomous. The French Emperor, Napoleon, interrupted Ottoman rule by 
propagating himself and his empire to be a liberator of Egypt from the Ottomans although 
his primary goals were to disrupt British trade routes, to control the Mediterranean, and 
build a canal in Suez to connect the east and west (Mediterranean and Red Seas) sea 
trade. British rule lasted from 1882 until 1936 when the last of Britain’s military presence 
was expelled, though advisors were kept in the government until Egypt’s 1952 military 
revolution.  
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declaring Egypt a republic in 1952. These leaders implemented land reform that would 
attempt in spread wealth to the citizens who were kept in poverty by the colonial 
monarchy. Yet at the same time however, most citizens who appeared to have gained 
wealth throughout the period of colonization would lose much of their status in the 
country.  
 With Nasser's effort to create a more egalitarian society, much of the population 
became polarized, as the educated population felt that they were being punished for being 
educated. Only two years later, the real architect of the Free Officers Movement, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and his followers would force Naguib into house arrest for his disapproval 
of Nasser's ideas of land reform and policy. Nasser would then become the president and 
nationalist figure of Egypt beginning in 1956. Nasser's presidency quickly led to the 
complete withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone, nationalizing the Suez 
Canal months later. According to Said Aburish in his work, Nasser: The Last Arab, 
Nasser’s disregard for opposition political parties, and his insistence on one national 
movement replacing the party system, permitted him to lead many major projects with 
undisputed power. This move gained Nasser national prominence, becoming a symbol for 
independence in the Middle East, as no one questioned his leadership. This period of rule 
under Nasser has been championed by some and loathed by others. Following an 
assassination attempt on Nasser's life during his speech celebrating Britain's withdrawal, 
he ordered one of the largest political crackdowns in Egyptian history- arresting 
approximately twenty thousand people made up of Muslim Brotherhood members, 
Communists, Wafd party followers, and any one else who opposed Nasser's rule 
(Aburish: 2004: pg. 53-55). With no opposition, Nasser quickly became the undisputed 
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leader of Egypt. He would then lead Egypt into a long period of war with Israel becoming 
a regional figure of the Arab world3 for the regions independence movements against 
colonizers. Nasser's Egypt became heavily militarized under their close friendship with 
the Soviet Union, as the country became the prototypical cold war proxy state (Aburish: 
2004: pg.272).  Nasser's regional prominence allowed for Egypt to become the 
powerhouse of the Arab world. They became leaders in military strength and society as 
the entertainment industry boomed in Egypt's favor. Though, Nasser's last war with Israel 
in 1967 led to Egypt losing control of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip. His 
presidency, filled with highs and lows, took a negative turn, as he was unable to unite the 
Arab world under his Pan-Arab policies. Failure to oust Israel indefinitely would put 
Egypt in a position of weakness that they would never recover from. 
 Nasser’s death and eventual end to his rule resulted in leadership change within 
the party as Anwar Sadat, a former leader of the Free Officers movement, became the 
next president of Egypt in 1970. Sadat played a large role in changing Egypt's cold-war 
alliance with the USSR to the United States, as the U.S. government was able to convince 
Sadat that the only super power that could create peace between Israel and Egypt was 
America. Sadat would continue this transformation by creating a new economic reform 
policy, known as Infitah, which opened the doors to free and open trade as well as private 
investment. His policies also opened the door to the development industry as USAID 
established their assistance program in Cairo. In 1973 Sadat led a surprise attack on 
                                                        
3 Pan-Arab policies focused on the unification of the Arab world and promoted Arab 
nationalism. The ‘Nasserist’ ideology, identified with socialist policies, defined pan-
Arabism throughout the 1960’s.  Nasser attempted to create a pan-Arab state that 
included Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, however the union failed to organize under one leader as 
Nasser sought to be the leader of a unified Arab state. Pan-Arabism was especially 
weakened due to Israel’s demoralizing victory in 1967 over the allied Arab states. 
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Israeli forces in order to re-occupy the Sinai Peninsula leading to heavy U.S. 
involvement.  
 Only four years later Sadat would be pushed by President Carter to make peace 
with Israel, following with a historic visit of the first Arab leader in the Jewish state and a 
final peace agreement in 1979.  Sadat's peace movement received little support from the 
Arab world but was heavily supported by most Egyptians, as he was able to regain Sinai 
with some dignity. Two years later, the Muslim fundamentalists he had attempted to keep 
quiet throughout his rule would assassinate President Sadat. His death was then followed 
by the rule of the party he created, the National Democratic Party (NDP), as well as a 
thirty-year period of rule by his former Air Force commander, Hosni Mubarak. 
 Hosni Mubarak took over as the undisputed leader of an even weaker Egypt. 
Following the peace treaty, Egypt was kicked out of the Arab league while losing its 
place in Arab history as the most powerful force in the region. Mubarak's thirty year 
reign of presidency saw virtually no dispute with Israel, a re-recognition of Egypt in the 
Arab League, a continued relationship with the United States, even at the end of the cold 
war, a continued economic policy of free trade and private investment, and the same 
political government crackdown on all opposition seen under Nasser and Sadat. On paper 
their were was extensive economic growth that failed to reach the majority of society. 
The two-year period prior to the Egyptian revolution in 2011 saw the worst 
unemployment rates under Mubarak. Endemic corruption and authoritarian governance 
resulted in a wealthier upper crust of society while the middle class shrunk, allowing the 
inevitable rise in poverty. 
  The logic of the state affects society in numerous ways and certainly has 
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destabilized civil society. Although there are over fifteen thousand non-governmental 
and/or civil organizations in Egypt, a number growing rapidly post-revolution, the 
recently passed law in 2002 (Law No. 84) greatly prohibits the freedom of these 
organizations. The law places great legislative restrictions on them while ultimately 
taking away from the spirit of being a democratic institution and being of the people. 
These legislative restraints are aimed at administrating/controlling the funding and NGO 
capabilities but have the adverse effect of stunting Egypt’s social activism and civil 
progression. Additionally, NGO’s must have government officials on their decision-
making boards in order to oversee the work of the organization and its congruence with 
the logic of the state. The very foundation of an NGO is broken with certain restrictive 
laws, such as the law No. 84. NGO’s are meant to be independent from any direct control 
of a public authority, they are often non-profit, they are not associated to a specific 
political party or campaign, and they are non-violent and non-criminal. Under certain 
articles of Law 84, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) actually grants 
influential rights and authority of the state over the operations of NGO’s in Egypt – a 
direct infringement to their universal right to freedom of association.  Article 11 in law 84 
forbids the “threatening (of) national unity, violating public order or morals, or calling for 
discrimination between citizens because of race, origin, color, language, religion or 
creed.” When a country prohibits its own people’s ability to speak, meet, and work 
collaboratively, they are devastating their own social progression and cohesion – 
ultimately, imprisoning the Egyptian people’s rights to freedom of association and 
expression. The state’s meddling in the affairs of civil society is a major factor behind 
social stagnation and how the state has controlled the social affairs of its citizens. 
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 The historical background of modern day Egypt is a necessary tool in 
understanding the logic in which the state runs its political, economic, and social policy. 
Un-democratic rule amongst its own citizens, deep relationships with external powers, 
and a corrupt system of governance has been central to the NDP and the Military Junta 
ruling the country. In 2011, in Mubarak's thirtieth year in power, the Egyptian people 
staged a revolution that would finally oust the thirty-year ruler out of his post. Since the 
ousting of Mubarak, Egypt has endured a tumultuous transitional period filled with 
human rights abuses, civil disobedience, a lack of security, the election and disbandment 
of parliament, and the election of new President Mohamed Morsi. The reasons behind 
why the movement continues, with citizens applying intense pressure on government, 
will be made clear throughout this paper.  
 
 
Literature Review: The Transformation of “State” and “Civil Society” 
 
For thirty years, the Mubarak regime oppressively ruled Egypt as a continuation 
of a military dictatorship instilled during the 1952 military “revolution.” It was not until 
January 25th 2011 that popular civil resistance and disobedience erupted in Cairo and 
surrounding governorates, which led to the ousting of the former president Hosni 
Mubarak and many of his supporters. Although many rogue members of the former 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) were eventually knocked out of leadership roles, 
the existence of a counter-revolution continues through the political survival of an 
authoritarian system. A state with an authoritarian system was bound to have a serious 
power vacuum without its head leadership. The group who believes they can fill the void 
of political leadership in hopes of instilling a more socially-conscious government is the 
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Muslim Brotherhood (MB), once an illegal organization built on the religious principles 
of Islam. With crippled institutions and an overpowering military, the current government 
behind the newly-elected President Morsi is battling to facilitate a constitute assembly 
(that is currently tasked with writing a constitution that represents all Egyptians), create 
parliamentary elections, alleviate the painful blow of an inflated economy, and attempt to 
fulfill the demands of the revolutionary movement, all the while fulfilling the political 
needs of his respective party (the Freedom and Justice Party).  
For this master’s thesis, research has been conducted that will identify what the 
state of Egypt looks like in terms of the new structure and centers of power, along with 
what the varying political and social dynamics of civil society are in Egypt. Some key 
questions are: a) Who are the varying influential actors and are these actors working for 
the collective advancement of society or do they have their own interests while being a 
coercive tool for the state? b) What does civil society look like in Egypt? In order to 
counter the recent literature on state-society relations that suggests that empowering civil 
society will result in democratization, the theoretical development of both the state and 
civil society over time will be presented. 
What is the state and civil society in the Egyptian (North African) context? 
Certainly understanding the political and social dynamics of the “Arab,” “North African” 
state can open the doors to understanding what is civil society in Egypt.  What is often 
left out of the discussion throughout this transformation is how there are sharp 
differences in state development, particularly when looking at “underdeveloped,” 
“developing,” and “developed” nations. Central authority varies from state-to-state 
depending on the historical and contemporary context. Unfortunately, the academic field 
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in the “developed” world has painted the discussion of the modern state by comparing 
Western nations (Europe and the U.S.), or the developed world, to the Global South or 
developing world. States with a less legitimate or encompassing central authority are 
interpreted as “weak” or having “failed.” This presents fundamental problems for the 
analysis of the state in the context of developing countries when they are compared in a 
developed world context. 
With tomorrow filled with uncertainty, this thesis will look to determine what the 
future holds for Egypt, particularly between the shifting political and social dynamics of 
civil society within the State. This literature review will first take a look at the varying 
interpretations of the State, its function, and what I have become comfortable to 
theoretically describe as the Egyptian state. Second, the root and many meanings of civil 
society will be put in to context in order to better conceptualize its role in Egypt’s society. 
This literature review will be organized as follows: a) classical definitions and 
interpretations of the State, b) classical definitions and interpretations of civil society, c) 
problems with contemporary definitions of civil society, and d) interpretations of the state 
and civil society in a developing world context. This review of the literature will be used 
to identify the common trends and schools of thought. However, most importantly, it will 
provide the context, background, and location of where the ideologies of this thesis will 
preside. 
 
Classical Definitions and Interpretations of the State 
 
Understanding the dynamics of a civil society warrants a clear understanding of 
exactly what the State is, particularly when describing Egypt. The basic online search 
took me to The Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, by Barry 
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Jones, providing the etymology of the word State and saying that the term derives from 
the Latin, status, or literally social status within a community. The Thomas Barfield’s 
Dictionary of Anthropology says that the state is a complex system of human society used 
to organize extensive populations and is made up of a “hierarchy of offices associated 
with specialized institutions that are financed by a political economy…General categories 
of state institution include administrative bureaucracies, legal systems, and military and 
religious organizations. Such institutions represent different sources of power- economic, 
political, military, and ideological” (Barfield, pg.445).   
One of the most commonly accepted interpretations is Max Weber’s definition of 
the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, Gerth and Mills, 1948: 
78). With this interpretation, the state is often seen as having “legitimate” authority. The 
state, or central authority, can legitimately use force to achieve its goals, can use violence 
against an individual or a group, can use the legal system to imprison citizens, and can 
wage war… and most individuals would agree that the state is legitimate in their actions 
and capabilities. According to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, the state is a product of 
reason, a highly rational system of order. With Weber’s definition, the state or central 
authority consists of several mechanisms, to create and pass laws, a bureaucracy for 
implementing laws or other governmental decisions within state institutions, maintain 
local security with a police force that maintains a prison system, and finally, to secure the 
borders with armed forces of the state against external threats. These mechanisms are the 
staple functions of the state, however, some sociologists have extended state institutions 
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to nationalized departments, for instance the Postal Service, or as seen in Europe, health 
and education services. 
The state has developed over the twentieth century to become the most dominant 
form of characterizing and controlling territory and people. Still, there are various forms 
of the state that must be discussed before demonstrating the type of state Egypt has 
become in the Twenty-First Century.  The most notable among these is the stateless 
society, or Nuer society, discussed by E.E. Evans-Pritchard in the, Nuer, a Description of 
the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Pritchard’s 
research in Africa recognized a society consisting of forty distinct tribes that had no 
government and no legal system while handing no special responsibilities to selected 
members of society. Decisions that affected their society as a whole were reached 
through informal means of discussion between different members of each tribe. The Nuer 
society is stateless because it lacks a formal governing body capable of legitimizing force 
or control over society.  
The feudal state, best seen as an early developer of the modern state, lacks a 
central authority with legitimate control over society. Although monarchs ruled feudal 
states, with ultimate power in the hands of a king or queen, control over territory and 
military was in the hands of governors and lords of a particular region. Power was 
dispersed throughout society allowing aristocrats to rule their territory in the name of the 
monarch. It was not until the Seventeenth Century where it is apparent that the French 
monarchy developed a centralized authority over its territory, however, centralized 
authority and the beginning of the modern state could not develop until the Nineteenth 
Century when transportation and communication progressed and expanded. The modern 
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state is the centralized state, which characterizes the majority of nation-states in this 
world. The modern state consists of a central power, or government, with an increased 
role within the state, such as greater influence on the economy, military power, and 
overall control. The modern state is a heavily scrutinized, researched, and debated 
phenomenon as centralized authority takes on responsibility for the well being of society. 
Still, modernity of the state does not imply that central authority will function in the best 
interests of all members of the state, as governments have been known to represent the 
interests of those in power. 
Pluralist theories of the state act as an institutional referee that allows all 
competing groups within society to have an equal opportunity in the governmental/policy 
decision-making process. Governmental power is divided into various competing 
agencies rather than from a central authority. Societal power is decentralized and is 
wielded by competing, diverse societal forces that equally share influence.  With a 
plethora of competing groups working for their own interests, the state coordinates 
differences between conflicting interests in the hope of promoting a well-balanced and 
shared existence. The state in this society is often influenced by democratic values and 
principles that empower average individuals and groups to accomplish as much political 
power as their lives would permit them. The political process for policy making is reliant 
on the political activity of competing and associated groups, as it is their responsibility to 
advocate and lobby towards the public, government representatives, and other groups 
with similar interests. Arnold Rose, a pluralist theorist, asserted “political power is 
distributed over as many citizens working through their associations as want to take 
responsibility for power, through the voluntary association the ordinary citizen can 
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acquire as much as power in the community or nation as their free time, ability and 
inclinations permit them.” Individuals may even associate themselves with varying, 
overlapping organizations or causes. This allows power to be distributed among various 
organizations and associations without having a dominant, all-powerful force that is 
agreed with by all members of society. This model is widely seen as inapplicable to states 
besides the U.S. and generates the assumption that formal political institutions play an 
unbiased or equitable role in policy making. Ultimately, the state is not an impartial 
intermediary and has its own agenda.    
The “Elite pluralism theory” led by renowned academics Seymour Martin Lipset 
and Robert Dahl’s “Polyarchy” uses the pluralist model to combine elite rule and 
democracy. Various competing groups are led, influenced by elites that apply political 
pressure for their interests, while minority groups are incapable of having their interests 
represented. Democratic principles are shifted away from the interests of the ‘average’ 
individual and instead surround the competing interests of elites. Political participation 
becomes distrusted as powerless groups and individuals lose power and influence to elite 
interests. 
The “elite theory” contains similar principles to the “elite pluralism theory” in that 
elite groups are in control of key resources and institutions, which results in varying 
elitist groups holding the majority of power. The intention of the elite class is to always 
hold on to power, to any extent necessary. The two driving ideas behind this theory is that 
firstly, elites are set apart from the masses due to their resources, education, overall 
capability and secondly, that this process is a natural product of society as influential 
elites who have authority are seen as necessary leaders. Pareto believed that there are two 
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types of elites, one that holds power through governance and the other that is non-
governing and utilizes elitist tools of resources and intelligence to coerce and manipulate 
members and groups of society. Mosca emphasized the fact that elite group interests and 
values become the dominating principles of society because of the heavy influence on 
social and political institutions.  Elites are well organized and the masses are not. 
Additionally, he asserted that societies are divided into two distinct groups, the rulers and 
the ruled. The ruling class is made up of elites that rule and govern the mass population. 
In contemporary power elite theory C. Wright Mills understood societal power to reside 
in within key social and political institutions that were run by an elite class. At the same 
time non-governing elites have a monopoly over economic institutions, control the 
majority of the state’s wealth, and therefore can affect policy making in government. He 
does not however deem the mass population to be incapable or incompetent, rather, elites 
manipulate and exploit the masses in order to keep the mass population in a state of 
confusion, ignorance and powerlessness. Furthermore, social groups within the mass 
population are able to benefit from the elitist ruling class, which results in divisions 
within the powerless. 
In conflict theories of the state, the economic sphere is understood as separate and 
apart from government institutions; however, Karl Marx believed that having control 
over the means of production is the primary principle for the ruling class in society. 
Marxist theory suggests that economic activity is central to life and that politics, 
education, the legal system, and religious or cultural institutions are a result of 
economics. He essentially states that societal power derives from economic dominance 
and that controlling the means of production perpetuates class domination of society. 
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Marx developed the concept that political warfare is class warfare and that power is a 
result of economic domination. 
Antonio Gramsci’s intellectual work has been of great service to the 
conceptualization of dynamics within the state. The state, Antonio Gramsci asserted is the 
unity of political and civil society, both jockeying for political, cultural, and ideological 
hegemony. He believed the state to be nothing but a tool or instrument for coercion, a 
“super-structure” of hegemonic dominance, and identified two kinds of states that 
represented the conditions of Europe. Firstly, the state is a dictatorship, a coercive multi-
faceted system that dominates over society.  Secondly, that the state is the totality of 
social, economic, political, and cultural relations that together form a given political and 
social order, resulting in a cultural and political hegemony. This dualistic understanding 
of the state can also be better understood as Gramsci’s “east vs. west” distinction. In the 
east, the state is fully dominant as civil society is seen as “gelatinous”. This kind of state 
domination results in civil society being suppressed, which only survives on challenging 
state hegemony.  In the west, the state and civil society is equal to the state. Civil society 
traditionally is a function of the state, which is a tool for coercion and acquiring 
hegemonic dominance over the system of governance and power. Gramsci expressed in 
his work, The Prison Notebooks, that the state is the unity of civil society and political 
society, similarly translated to the state being a combination of hegemony and 
dictatorship. From now on, hegemony refers to the domination and coerciveness of the 
state and the ruling power within the state- whether economic, political, cultural, etc. For 
instance, educational and religious institutions have the ability to be dominant in what is 
being taught and “believed” in by the mass population. Furthermore, these institutions are 
a function of the state therefore the state is able to have social and political hegemony. 
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Ji-Hyang Jang in her article, Weak State, Weak Civil Society, asserts the 
theoretical opposite of pluralism by introducing the ‘corporatist’ state. Rather than 
Gramsci’s east versus west scenario, they present the discussion on the state as a 
“pluralism versus corporatism” scenario. The pluralist state “is viewed as a collection of 
individuals occupying particular official roles and as an arena within which societal 
actors struggle to ensure the success of their own particular preferences through electoral 
pressure and lobbies” (Jang, 2009: 82). The pluralist state is more like a referee, serving 
as a facilitator of interest groups and institutions, in order for state hegemony. Inversely, 
the state in the “corporatism paradigm is the decisional and authoritative structure linked 
with the associationally organized interests of civil society” (Jang, 2009: 82).   The 
corporatist structure finds a greater role for the state in order to directly manipulate the 
economy and the social groups of society. Furthermore, pluralists and corporatists “offer 
opposing political remedies and divergent images of the institutional form that such a 
modern system of interest representation will take. The former suggest spontaneous 
formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension, and competitive interaction; the 
latter advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification, and 
complementary interdependence” (Schmitter 1979: 16). Jang makes the direct 
comparison of the corporatist state and several Arab nations, including Egypt. This is 
because the state heavily intervenes in the economy, is the primary catalyst for economic 
development, and the corporatist state is the only actor that can make the necessary 
market and political prescriptions, whether this occurs is another story. The state 
(government) then successfully has pinned itself in a “permanent” state of hegemony, 
while civil society, as Gramsci pointed out, is “gelatinous”. 
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Definitions and Interpretations of Civil Society 
 
What is civil society? The term “civil society” is often employed to describe a 
coercive function of the state, or as a challenger and/or an advocator of state hegemony. 
Civil society was already a relevant term pre-revolution, particularly when it came to the 
overgrown development apparatus that resides in Egypt. Still, the term civil society has 
taken on a new relevance in Egypt, post-revolution, especially as social and political 
scientists wrestle with the term and its influence on the Arab social movements. Civil 
society has taken on different roles and meanings over time and within varying state 
structures, which is why I will be highlighting its transformation over time and space. 
The etymological roots of civil society, without digging too deeply and with 
valuable help, can be found in the foundations of early European society Latin, where 
civis means citizen and civitas means civil, the embodiment of community, city, state, 
and the body of citizens within it. There are many scholars over time that have indeed 
influenced the classical meaning, character, and interpretation of civil society, namely, 
Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci. However it is through the 
use of Gramsci’s work on civil society that will represent the majority of classical 
interpretations of the term. 
In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci argues that the roots of a functioning civil 
society, as a superstructure challenging the state, can be traced to the rise of the Catholic 
Church and the gradual fall of the Holy Roman Empire. The church had the capability to 
challenge state hegemony due to their influence on, for example, growing religious 
identity, individualism, social life, and education. Only the church had the power 
capabilities of altering state ideology in favor of another hegemonic force, their selves. 
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With the church and state hegemony swinging side to side, the state was never fully able 
to dominate the church and vice versa. This then created a new space, a space that exists 
between hegemonies, where social groups, media, organizations, and religious 
institutions could challenge and debate state hegemony.  
Gramsci’s valiant attempt in conceptualizing civil society began originally as a 
plan to “discover the political, theoretical, and strategic means to organize and mobilize 
subordinate groups within society so that they might usher in a new form of state and 
order” (Fontana, 1993: 342).   For Gramsci, civil society includes the whole of the 
ideological, cultural, spiritual, and intellectual life. He did not consider the market or 
economics to play a role in civil society and believed civil society to represent the active 
and positive moments of historical development. In many ways he considered civil 
society to be the “arena of struggle”.  Additionally, he claimed that civil society would be 
the super-structure capable of challenging the state. By ‘challenging’, Gramsci meant the 
swallowing of political society, the end of the state, the altering of a state system and of 
political ideology. Gramsci believed the integral state to be civil and political society; 
meaning civil society is a part of the state. However, “in his (Gramsci’s) view, civil 
society, far from being inimical to the state, is, in fact, its most resilient constitutive 
element, even though the most immediately visible aspect of the state is political society, 
with which it is all too often mistakenly identified. He was also convinced that the 
intricate, organic relationships between civil society and political society enable certain 
strata of society not only to gain dominance within the state but also, and more 
importantly, to maintain it, perpetuating the subalternity of other strata.” (Buttigieg, pg. 
4; 1995) This point of an organic relationship between the civil and the political is 
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certainly a key feature of the relationships within the Egyptian state.  The supremacy of 
an individual social group manifests itself in two ways, firstly, through domination and 
secondly, through moral and intellectual leadership. A social group must exercise 
leadership before winning governmental power, as it is through that leadership that 
ideologies and values can be represented in order to attain the favor of social groups.  
However, if it is to “hold power firmly within its grasp, the social group must continue to 
‘lead’” (Fontana, 1993: 343).   
The primary differences between Gramscian and Hegelian theory regarding the 
functions of civil society and the state are that Hegel believed the state to be a natural 
phenomenon, one that can be seen as a positive moment in the historical development of 
human history. Gramsci believed the state to be none other than an instrument or coercive 
tool of the state. Secondly, Gramsci asserted that civil society was ideological, cultural, 
spiritual, and intellectual aspects of society, while, Hegel would later critique his 
assertion, saying that, the economic-financial sphere of society is also a part of civil 
society. Both Gramsci and Hegel believed civil society to be the ethical content of the 
state. This is extremely relevant considering Egypt’s civil society is diverse in its ethical 
nature while differing in Egypt’s course for the future. 
Jeffrey Church has also added to the discussion of civil society by determining the 
differences between Rousseau and Hegel, who were particularly fixated on what would 
happen to civil society if it included the commercial industry and economic spheres of 
life. Church asserts one of Rousseau’s main arguments from the Social Contract, saying, 
“human desire in commercial societies has become insatiably expensive and increasingly 
detached from genuine political communities” (Church, 2009: 125).  Rousseau believed 
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that commercial societies ultimately end up with citizens caring more about their 
individual welfare over the welfare of others or the community as a whole. Citizens then 
become ‘unsatisfied’ with life because of their selfishness, which undermines their own 
individual civic participation for the community. Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, 
believed civil society institutions to be the answer to Rousseau’s problem. For Hegel, it is 
the goal of these institutions within civil society to curb irrational individual desires in 
favor for rational desires of the common good. 
State and civil society theories of Fontana, Bobbio, and Buttigieg, believe that 
Gramsci’s writings also provide elaborate insight on the functions, players, and on the 
capabilities of challenging state hegemony. In congruence with the Gramscian school of 
thought, Fontana, in his work Political Space and Hegemonic Power, expresses the 
importance of physical space, geography, and a large structural presence. Property and 
large structures of the state, along with fortresses and institutions of civil society, are 
meant to protect the state. These structures further convolute the presence of the multi-
dimensional super-structure of power, known as the state, in order to increase a veiled 
coercion.  Fontana asserted “Civil society is envisioned as constituted by multiple and 
overlapping spheres. Civil society is not one and harmonious, but a plurality of spaces, 
socio-political and physical/territorial” (Fontana,1993: 345). Within the same article, he 
explains that, “the greater the structural complexity, the more the ideological systems of 
belief and thought are embedded within the population, the less transparent the coercive 
nature of the state appears, and the more effective and consequential become the 
instruments of persuasion and consent” (Fontana, 1993: 348) Joseph Buttigieg, in the 
journal “Boundary 2”, wrote on the contemporary discourse on civil society. Buttigieg 
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believed many present theorists have misinterpreted Gramsci’s understanding that civil 
society was certainly an important part of the state, as opposed to a separate, anti-state 
institution. He asserts in his article that, “Gramsci regarded civil society as an integral 
part of the state; in his view, civil society, far from being inimical to the state, is, in fact, 
its most resilient constitutive element, even though the most immediately visible aspect 
of the state is political society, with which it is all too often mistakenly identified. He was 
also convinced that the intricate, organic relationships between civil society and political 
society enable certain strata of society not only to gain dominance within the state but 
also, and more importantly, to maintain it, perpetuating the subalternity of other strata” 
(Buttigieg, 1995: 4). 
  Classical civil society, as James Ferguson argued in his work Global Shadows: 
Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, “still had a rather antique cast to it when I [he] first 
encountered it in graduate seminars on social theory.” The classical use of civil society 
had seen little alterations from Hegelian, Marxist, and Gramscian theories up until the 
mid-twentieth century cold-war period that began the inception of social movements and 
particularly throughout the debate of Communist versus Democratic hegemony. Indeed 
civil society has been altered to fit the contemporary context and became especially 
popular among liberal scholars for the purposes of social movement theory and neoliberal 
thought. The following section will discuss the transformation of civil society as a 
superstructure of society outside of the political realm, to the more recent belief in 
literature and policy that civil society is a democratic arena for challenging state 
dominance led by innovative, energetic grassroots initiatives, associations, and 
organizations. 
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The Universalization of Civil Society as a Grassroots Actor 
 
Interpretations of civil society have gone through transformations as the role of 
the state has developed over time. What was once classically believed to be civil society 
in the west has changed significantly in a time when state power is evidently growing 
weaker, rolling back the state in favor of a long suffocated civil society. The term gained 
its popularity in large part to the growing struggles for political and social space between 
people and their government, mostly constituting of military dictatorships. Civil society 
is now something to be supported, to build capacity for, just as “development” has a 
staple role in “still developing” societies. What was once described as everything outside 
of the government and political realm is now often times being defined to describe 
specific sectors of the state, specifically non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade 
unions, and grassroots organizations. Civil Society International produces their own 
definition, saying “Perhaps the simplest way to see civil society is as a "third sector," 
distinct from government and business. In this view, civil society refers essentially to the 
so-called "intermediary institutions" such as professional associations, religious groups, 
and labor unions, citizen advocacy organizations that give voice to various sectors of 
society and enrich public participation in democracies.” Civil society is contemporarily 
seen as the path to democracy, a sector of society that is necessary to develop, as it is a 
democratic arena for social groups and organizations outside of the state to alter, 
improve, criticize, and take action for ideologies that do or do not represent society. This 
newer relationship between state and civil society is commonly referred to as the “state-
society paradigm.” 
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The late twentieth century, along with the new century, ushered in a new class of 
political scientists and anthropologists alike that have taken a new direction in defining 
the civil society sector. The term has been uniquely modified as a major step for 
emerging democracies, as naturally democratic sector of society, as “the local”, and as 
the home for voluntary civil society organizations that work on “the ground” to defend 
social justice issues and to claim space from political society.  This notion rivals the 
earlier “nation-building” theory that understood the “state”, or national level of 
government, as a “new, dynamic, progressive national level energizing and overcoming 
an old, stagnant, reactionary local level, the new view reverses these values” (Ferguson, 
2007: 96). The universalization of civil society as grassroots actors most certainly 
spawned from the political liberalization of Latin America and Eastern Europe as their 
societies struggled but successfully challenged communist hegemony. Not coincidentally, 
the state-society model was championed by Western democracies, including former U.S. 
President Reagan and former British Prime Minister Thatcher, perhaps planting the seeds 
for a post-socialist rhetoric and paving the way for the future democratization of the 
“developing world”. Civil society has become so intertwined with “democracy”, 
supporting the local, and grassroots organizations that discrediting it would seem like 
discrediting a pacifist’s or environmentalist’s intentions.  This why civil society today is 
relevant in policy making, in scholarly literature, and in the media, because just as state’s 
want to be democratic, there is high demand for growing and empowering civil society. 
Furthermore, civil society is intimately intertwined with the development field, only 
strengthening its inorganic ties to the nation-state’s path to democracy.  The resurgence 
of civil society, both theoretically and in policy, is made evident by the relationship of 
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foreign, and specifically, Western development agencies that have utilized civil society 
globally as a means to influence hegemony and avoid the lack of cooperation coming 
from national governments. 
James Ferguson responds to the definition and use of the term “civil society”, 
without getting deeply into the genealogy of the phrase, and references Scottish 
Enlightenment theorists Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith, as well as 
other European thinkers Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, to arrive to the basic concept that 
civil society is most commonly used in “discussions of democracy, especially to refer to 
voluntary organizations and NGOs that seek to influence, or claim space from, the state” 
(Ferguson, 2007: 90). This understanding of civil society has made way for the fact that 
“civil society” has become a universalized concept, filling the void for other state 
challengers (communism) and best describing the post-cold war period of state 
dominance versus the group assembled as “everyone else”. The state’s power, 
particularly in African politics, is well represented by economically active military 
forces, dictatorial ruling parties, security-police forces, over-sized bureaucracies, weak 
state institutions, and a national ideology that leaves the rest of the nation for “the 
opposition” or “civil society”.  Ferguson writes, “Indeed, it has become one of those 
things (like development, education, or the environment) that no reasonable person can 
be against” (pg.91).  This is a profound statement because the activity of civil society is 
championed by both the state and the opposition, right or left, and both sides nurture 
different and opposed ideologies for civil society’s role within the state- though both 
recognizing it’s importance. Questionable? Perhaps this is why the genealogy of the term 
is vital. While the universalized use of civil society implies democratic principles of 
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equality, whether true or not, the study of civil society within the African context, as 
Ferguson puts it, “obscures more than it reveals” and in several case can be a force that 
legitimizes undemocratic principles of African politics and the state (Ferguson, 2007: 
91). Still, the resurgence of civil society in Africa is mostly tied to the process of 
democratization and these cases have emphasized a larger role for civil society and less a 
role for the state, for better or worse. 
When imagining what the state looks like in this state-society paradigm, writers 
Mahmood Mamdani and Jurgen Habermas create a visualization of state-civil society 
relations as being vertical and hierarchal. Mamdani explains that civil society is 
“sandwiched between the patriarchal family and the universal state” (Mamdani, 1996). 
Similarly, Habermas describes civil society as being the “public sphere” that mediates 
between the state and the local. This imagery allows one to believe, or interpret, the state 
as being a “higher power” while civil society is on the ground or local. This vertical 
relationship is heavily scrutinized by James Ferguson, and rightfully so, as he too 
questions not only the vertical hierarchy of state-society relations but also the misleading 
manner in which the state is seen as “above”, “up top”, and “too-far to reach”.  The 
vertical alignment claim is to the advantage of state power or political society, as 
Ferguson asserts, “these claims naturalize the authority of the state over “the local” by 
merging three analytically distinct ideas-superior spatial scope; supremacy in a hierarchy 
of power; and superior generality of interest, knowledge, and moral purpose- into a single 
figure, the “up there” state that encompasses the local and exists on a “higher level”” 
(Ferguson, 2007: 92).  
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Additionally, Gramsci points to how dominant social groups can pin the subaltern 
groups against one another in order to fulfill that one group’s hegemonic dominance. In 
Egypt the state repeatedly creates divisions between the varying groups of society, 
leaving little room for cooperation, unity, and cohesiveness among civil society.  Long-
term development is difficult and unappreciated due to limited funds, government 
support, and lack of networking; this makes way for those with the finances to determine 
major courses of development. Furthermore, the state has infiltrated institutions, 
organizations, and NGOs in order to maintain rhetoric and ideological dominance. 
Civil society, as many have come to know it and how I’ve always been taught, is 
a dynamic sphere of grassroots and dynamic local organizations that have the interests of 
the population at heart. These organizations suffered at the hands of the state and need 
more space and financial support for them to be successful in their development goals. 
However what is left out of the assumption, as Jane Guyer claimed, “the obvious: that 
civil society is largely made up of international organizations (Guyer 1994:223, Ferguson 
pg. 101).” This statement cannot be made any clearer and rivals civil society perceptions 
published by the UN and other organizations. 
In a CIVICUS civil society index report (Civicus, 2010: 5) on Egypt highlights 
civil society as being, up until recently, a fuzzy grey area where civil society mostly 
described the registered civic associations under the Ministry of Social Affairs. Since this 
definition does not quite fulfill the entirety of civil society, especially considering the 
number of informal organizations not tied down to the government or “Gongos” who are 
inherently tied to the government, civil society in Egypt is not easily defined. Similarly, 
The UN 2008 Egypt Human Development Report determined that civil society in Egypt 
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is “a social space occupied by citizens in which they organize themselves voluntarily to 
promote common values and objectives… and is an arena of voluntary collective actions 
around shared interests, purposes and values distinct from family, state, and profit-
seeking institutions. It is a particular space in a society where people come together to 
debate, associate and seek to influence broader society.” Both reports develop a 
borderline confusing; broad, non-specific, definition of civil society, with the Civicus 
report even stating that civil society is not easily defined. That is because, Egyptian civil 
society is not inherently “Egyptian” as we are meant to believe and his heavily affected, 
funded, scrutinized, and directed by external entities of the neoliberal development 
industry. While many of these organizations may have positive intentions for the ‘local’ 
or civil society, the influence of transnational organizations and global civil society on 
national civil society must be questioned further, perhaps altering the preconceived 
notion that civil society is “local or grassroots”, is in the best interest of the local 
population, or that civil society works outside of political society. Similarly, the phrase 
“Gongo” or “governmental non-governmental organizations” comes to mind when 
considering Egyptian civil society, and while they are an essential part of the 
transnational circuit, their relevance as ‘grass root’ is questionable. Civil society in the 
“state-society” paradigm are supposed to have a vested interest in limiting the state’s 
reach and dominance, instead, it is infiltrated by organizations that are government 
influenced or controlled- expanding the reach and power of the state- creating what may 
be the biggest oxymoron of twenty first century politics. 
 
The Two Paradigms of the State (James Ferguson, pg.98) 
National Nation-Building 
 
State and Society 
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National integration: 
 
Modernity:            + 
Democracy:           + 
Development:       + 
Progress:                + 
 
The State: 
 
Modernity:              - 
Democracy:             - 
Development:         - 
Progress:                  - 
Local Tribal, Primordial 
attachments: 
 
Modernity:              - 
Democracy:             - 
Development:         - 
Progress:                  - 
 
Civil Society: 
 
Modernity:            + 
Democracy:           + 
Development:       + 
Progress:                + 
 
 
 
Civil Society in the Egyptian Context: A Critique  
 
Today, when analyzing the Egyptian revolution and other popular social 
movements against state leadership of the Arab world, it becomes ever more urgent to 
understand the current role of civil society along with the importance of understanding 
what kind of practices it is involved in. James Ferguson’s analysis states that civil society 
must be reinterpreted, re-imagined, and re-understood, before making claims of an 
undefined, broad civil society, in order to correctly capture what civil society is in 
actuality and therefore correctly capturing the role of civil society in post-revolution 
Egypt. This section will discuss the problems with today’s understanding of civil society 
as a grassroots actor and why the re-conceptualization of civil society is vital. 
Ferguson’s vivid description of the vertical topography of power brings to mind 
images of the mighty Egyptian state, the Pharaoh, the Father, the nurturer, the scientist, 
the businessman, the protector of his people, and the one who knows best for a successful 
society. Is civil society really the space where the father and his leadership, “the state”, 
meet his children, “society”, and shows face to the community? This mental image may 
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serve well as the state’s interpretation of their role among civil society. Rather than 
perpetuating the belief that civil society is “the local” while the state lays “above us all”, 
Ferguson recommends a “horizontal topography of power” that claims there are these 
new political entities, that can often equal the strengths and capabilities of African nation-
states. The IMF, WB, UN, and hundreds of transnational organizations ‘developing’ the 
‘undeveloped’ represents a “new apparatus [that] does not replace the older system of 
nation-states, but overlays it and coexists with it…the new organizations that have sprung 
up in recent years not as challengers pressing up against the state from below but as 
horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the state—sometimes rivals, sometimes 
servants, sometimes watchdogs, sometimes parasites, but in every case operating on the 
same level and in the same global space” (Ferguson, 2007:103). If domination of the state 
is rooted to state power, as political society, then according to the state and society 
paradigm, rolling back the power of the state would lead to more freedom of civil society 
and ultimately more “democracy”. Ferguson, referencing the recent African colonial 
period, knows that non-state actors have also dominated the state, more specifically by 
private corporations, as some even hold a private army and can often dictate to the state. 
One must come to realize that using today’s understanding of civil society, especially in 
policy for the “developing world”, can be dangerous for society’s well being. Western 
Policy and foreign aid promotes civil society in the developing world in the hope of 
empowering “the bottom” of society or the mass population of these nations. Instead, 
promoting and empowering civil society has resulted in the convenient funding of 
transnational and government influenced organizations that work within and for the 
system, perpetuating the current dynamics of power. 
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A first step made in altering the conceptualization of civil society is to recognize 
that a top-down, vertical approach of the state does not correctly portray the state’s 
relation to civil society. The altering of this concept will simultaneously challenge 
scholarly approaches to civil society-state relations as well as unintentionally challenging 
the ruling power’s own awareness of supposedly residing on the top of the ‘food chain’ 
or above the rest of society. The government and military of Egypt, Egyptian political 
society, does believe that they are in fact untouchable and above the rest of society, 
however, Egyptian political society does not have the institutional capacity to bring about 
economic, social, and political change—which is why altering the vertical top-down 
approach may actually assist in lessening expectations of government, although this is an 
unlikely reaction from the state. 
Civil society must be conceptualized, not as a simple grass root actor, but as it 
really is, an elaborate network of transnational and local organizations that are led and 
often funded by governmental and intergovernmental organizations of the world. The 
term is referenced broadly just as often as it is referenced specifically, highlighting 
society as a whole but sometimes categorizing civil society organizations (CSOs) as 
strictly grass root or voluntary. Ferguson asks an important question, “one is never sure: 
Is the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa part of this “civil society”? John 
Garang’s army in Sudan? Oxfam? What about ethnic movements that are not opposed to 
or prior to modern states, but produced by them? What about Christian mission 
organizations, which are arguably more important today in Africa than ever but are 
strangely relegated to the colonial past in the imagination of much contemporary 
scholarship (Ferguson, 2007: 98-99)?” Is civil society simply broken down into 
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categories and what constitutes as a CSO? Where is the line drawn between state and 
civil society, and who is who? Arguably all of these organizations play a role within the 
state, but cannot be cleanly labeled or identified as the traditional “civil society actor” 
that works for the interests of society over the state.  
Without drawing deeply into my research, the role of supposed “civil society 
organizations” within the state is so badly characterized and understood that it is 
reasonable to question the motives, the alliances, and the agendas of what civil society is 
in Egypt, and as Ferguson described earlier, the term civil society “obscures more than it 
reveals.”  In some cases, the state begins to look like civil society, with registered 
Governmental Non-Governmental organizations (GONGOS) doing the development 
work. With the euphoria of the recent uprising and revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak 
lessoning by the day, the transnational development apparatus has made a point to be 
more actively involved in Egypt’s growth- similar to the Mubarak regime. Since 
President Morsi has been elected, he has looked for IMF loans, continues to rely on US 
funding, and increased Saudi Arabian and Islamic funding, while at the same time 
appealing to the social movement and liberal base of organizations that want to support 
“the revolutionaries”. The state has reaped the benefits of this social movement, sadly, 
falling into the same debt trap as his predecessor. 
Furthermore, the reconceptualization of civil society is necessary to determine 
whether Egyptian civil society is legitimate in working for the best interests of the 
country or whether it is in fact a variation of coercive organizations with interests outside 
the Egyptian people at the epicenter of their beliefs.  Egyptian civil society must be 
separated from global civil society, and local organizations must be differentiated 
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between transnational organizations, and vice versa. It is clear that funding civil society is 
necessary, however where does the money come from? What is the agenda and program 
of donor organizations, especially government donors? There are many local grassroots 
organizations that are not capable in carrying out their goals without the assistance or 
support of transnational organizations with shared interests, however, can local 
communities and organizations receive funding for their work in civil society without the 
funding being either, tied to the local government’s agenda, or to the imperialist agendas 
of foreign governments? There are examples of this happening though resulting in a 
harsh clamp down (accompanied by office raids) by the government. 
While funding civil society carries a great level of importance, it is also worth 
noting that transnational organizations can have positive effects on a local civil society. 
Transnational connections have allowed local communities to creatively challenge the 
state in ways that the national government is unaware of. Grassroots organizations are 
well established and can use funding for creating even more space for civil society, easily 
surprising the state. However, there is now a network of transnational organizations that 
are connected to the global as much as the local, and will have their largest effect on 
global public opinion- allowing these organizations to apply “watchdog” like pressure on 
the not so local actions of the state. Local organizations can now easily link their cause 
for the cause of transnational organizations, increasing global appeal, interest, and in 
general the kind of global activity that the state would like to stay away from- particularly 
when actively violating human rights. 
 
Civil Society in a ‘Strong versus Weak’ State 
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This literature review brings to focus the distinct and differing nature of the ‘state’ 
and civil society’s role within it. What needs to be discussed are the dynamics of the 
‘developing’ state and how civil society does indeed serve a differing function than how 
it is understood in the ‘developed’ world. 
In Nazih Ayubi’s article “Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the 
Middle East” the main argument is that although most Arab states, especially Egypt, are 
‘hard’, ‘fierce’ states, and they are not really ‘strong’ states. Meaning, yes, they have 
large, overbearing bureaucracies, large armies, and a harsh prison system, but they also 
happen to be “lamentably feeble when it comes to collecting taxes, winning wars or 
forging a really ‘hegemonic’ power block or an ideology that can carry the state beyond 
the coercive and ‘corporative’ level and into the moral and intellectual sphere” (Ayubi, 
1995). The state is not ‘strong’ because the majority of people does not benefit enough or 
buy into the current power structure that the Arab state is ruled by, which is arguably a 
reason why the revolution beginning in 2011 was able to occur. 
Halim Barakat eloquently described in his piece “The Arab World: Society, 
Culture, and State”, that the Arab state can be quite fragmented between civil and 
political society. Barakat explains that culturally and socially, there is one broad, over-
arching society, “Arab”, and it is a social culture independent of the state. In other words, 
he describes, “Arab society is not a mere mosaic of sects, ethnic groups, tribes, local 
communities, and regional entities. Rather, it carries within it the potential for both unity 
and divisiveness…unity versus fragmentation, tradition versus modernity, sacred versus 
secular, East versus West, local versus national” (Barakat, 1993). This is what Egyptian 
civil society is dealing with, as Gramsci described, a fight for cultural hegemony. The 
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current President, Morsi, represents not only Egypt, but also a group (the Muslim 
Brotherhood) that is challenging Western ideologies in order to achieve the social and 
cultural hegemony that will allow the civil and the political to share political, economic, 
and social ethics. 
This understanding of Egypt as a state, and the way in which it functions, will be 
the “Egypt” I will refer to throughout this thesis. Egypt became an official state in 1952 
but has had the tendencies of a unified state like structure for millennium. Additionally, 
colonialism, led by the British and French, was another important factor for the creation 
of a developed state apparatus, military, and nationalist movements. Gramsci’s “state of 
the east” is one of state hegemonic domination and a heavily regulated civil society. 
Similarly, Egypt is dominated by the state; it has a highly regulated, un-united, and 
malleable civil society- of course unable to truly challenge the state, and in some cases 
working for its own interests, the interests of the political status-quo, or external forces. 
State institutions do not provide the necessary assistance to individuals and social groups, 
instead generally working for the interests of the ruling party. The state owns many high 
earning industries in order to finance their domination, provides subsidies for a majority 
of social groups creating dependence, and monitors social and political development to 
the point that civil society has limited space to effectively challenge or counter-act the 
state’s faults. Social groups are forced to “wheel and deal”, or bargain, with the state in 
order find itself in their favor while avoiding marginalization. To be seen in the state’s 
favor has the same effect as being formalized or supported. Jang’s ‘State Typology’ table 
is useful for determining Egypt’s functions as a state. For example, corporatist states are 
seen as having a weak degree of legitimacy and institutional quality, the reason why it is 
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a corporatist state. Furthermore, the table also shows that the nature of exercising power 
for corporatist states is through “hard power”. This “hard” power, as asserted by 
Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hobbes’s Leviathan, points to the importance of control 
over resources, military, and financial entities as a necessity for control and domination 
over society. The use of such resources enables the ruling party to control the behavior of 
societal actors. Utilizing literature on the conceptualization of the state and it’s function, 
Egypt will be determined as a Gramscian state of the east, with a gelatinous civil society 
given little room to develop, organize, or encompass cultural hegemony, and Ayubi’s 
corporatist, “hard yet weak” state, which exercises “hard” power but is stricken with a 
degree of weakness for legitimacy and institutional quality. However, I want to make 
clear, that the Egypt is not so simply divided between political and civil society 
institutions. The lines are blurry, many civil society institutions, including religious 
leadership, for example Al-Azhar, media outlets, and non-governmental organizations are 
controlled by the state and therefore work against civil society and in favor of state 
dominance. 
Today, the state is often dictated to by another dominate force: transnational 
organizations, including but not limited to the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, other allied 
and affiliated banks, and especially government development agencies. This appears to 
be a form of transnational dominance or “internationalized imperialism” (Frederick 
Cooper). These organizations, together, promote development practices in the form of 
structural adjustment programs in order to ‘develop’ the state that is unable to finance the 
programs themselves- severely imposing on sovereignty. These developmental practices 
are almost entirely matched with provisions, expectations, and rules that must be upheld 
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by the recipient government. While these guidelines promote the ideals and values of the 
universal declaration of human rights and neoliberal macroeconomic policy, and what is 
often championed as central to any transnational loan program, the devil is most certainly 
in the details. These policies require “broad macroeconomic interventions as setting 
currency-exchange rates, but also fairly detailed requirements for curtailing social 
spending, restructuring state bureaucracies, and so on. In other words, rather significant 
and specific aspects of state policy, for many African countries, are being directly 
formulated in places like New York and Washington D.C” (Cooper, 2005:100). 
In the case of Care International, they are welcomed by the Egyptian government 
and even carry on their work through presidential decree, allowing them to avoid any of 
the basic restrictions found with transnational organizations. In this case, Care Egypt, 
which is a recipient of USAID money, is relied on to perform the state’s functions by 
providing schools to more rural communities that see little state intervention. As a result, 
these schools are not seen as locally created, they are not perceived as a government 
operation, but they are recognized as “CARE schools” by the local population. Is CARE, 
who carries out this state function, a prototypical organization of civil society? 
Transnational organizations, like CARE, are not well defined and awkwardly play a dual 
role of both the local and global. Organizations like these, where do they stand in the 
vertical topography of power? An organization like I have mentioned is certainly not 
below the state, if they have been performing functions of the state for many decades and 
is now seen as a staple development provider, where do they stand between the 
government and the people, or “top” and “bottom”? 
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Civil society, according to the Egyptian state, is a collection of organizations that 
are officially legitimized and regulated by the government. Grassroots organizations on 
the other hand are not considered to be civil society, rather, the government contends that 
these unofficial, informal groups are a threat to national security and intend on 
destabilizing the nation. 
These analytical alterations will ultimately allow my research and overall thesis to 
correctly label civil society for what it is, and what it is not. Using the varying literature 
on civil society, it is important to understand the transformation of the term over time. 
Referencing classical definitions along with the more contemporary universalization of 
civil society, as a grassroots actor will set the table for my thesis which questions what 
Egyptian civil society actually is in practice. My research should allow growth for 
understanding what civil society looks like in an African country, and may help scholars 
distinguish between how they define civil society in the future. Additionally, it should 
also assist in the critique towards transnational organizations and global civil society. My 
research intends on giving credit to those that deserve it, those that apply pressure on 
government and do not perpetuate their dominance, those that were involved in the 
revolution, and namely informal individuals and groups that are hidden under the 
shadows of large, corporate, CSOs. Furthermore, in fostering a better understanding of 
CSO’s in Egypt, this thesis should be able to make some prescriptions, advice, and 
speculate on the future direction of civil society- leading to what the future holds for a 
post-revolution Egypt.  
 
 
 
Methodology  
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Primary, qualitative research was conducted throughout Cairo, Egypt to explore 
the dynamics in which the Egyptian state and civil society are made up of multiple forces 
formally and informally, including the “street”, local and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), a robust USAID program and newly formed political parties 
following the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak. Due to the nature of this 
diversity, there were particular challenges, setbacks and experiences that have provided 
valuable insight. Individuals involved in interviews were potentially at risk based on the 
politically charged content of questioning, particularly when representing “informal” 
constituencies, a non-governmental organization or institutions outside of government. 
With honest questioning came open criticism that then resulted in a potential risk for the 
interviewees and myself. Understanding these potential risks are crucial not only in a 
time where the political condition of the state is fragile and sensitive but also regarding 
the validity of the research collected.  
The methodology will provide an outline on the description of sample subjects, 
access to subjects, the recruitment procedure, the subject consent process, as well as the 
potential risks and benefits to research subjects. The Egyptian state and civil society are 
made up of multiple forces formally and informally, including the activists of the 
“street”, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), USAID, 
development contractors, religious institutions and newly formed political parties 
following the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak. What should be stated is that 
when I describe individuals as being “educated” I am insinuating their ability to speak 
multiple languages. This is relevant in regards to the interview process that will occur in 
both Arabic and English. I will provide a short description of the subjects per sample. 
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Members of these social forces will be interviewed, along with the use of informative 
news media sources, in order to determine what civil society is in Egypt and what their 
role will be in the future image of what Egypt will look like post-revolution. 
 
Sample Description 
 
This research’s subject sample includes various actors from the state as well as 
formal and informal civil society. The single interview with a state actor was with a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) although this interview will have a minimal 
role in the analytical process. Additionally, the MB plays an active role in civil society 
and cannot be solely seen as a state actor. The remainder of social forces within the state 
and the remainder of the subjects for this research include members of, what is perceived 
to be more or less, civil society. These subjects include, local and international NGO 
workers, one USAID official, development contractors, activists from the left leaning 
“street” and informal organizations known as initiatives, as well as members of the 
Mosque and the Coptic Christian church. Similar to the MB interview, interviews with 
religious institutions (namely the Mosque and the Coptic Church) were limited and have 
a minimal role in the analysis. For the remainder of this section, each social group/ force 
in society will be described more in depth. The subjects that are primarily utilized 
throughout the analytical process are local NGOs, International NGOs, foreign 
government development agencies that includes USAID and development contractors, as 
well as a group of grassroots and informal activists. The table below provides more detail 
of the types of organizations  
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      Local NGOs 
 
International NGOs 
Foreign 
Government 
Sponsored 
Development 
Agencies 
 
Activists/ Informal 
Orgs. 
 
Masr Al Kheir  
 
Education for 
Employment 
 
CARE Egypt 
 
Relief Egypt 
 
Plan Egypt 
 
USAID: Democracy 
and Governance 
official 
 
Three 
Development 
Contractors  
 
Three Activists 
 
Two members of 
Initiatives 
(informal 
organizations 
 
Two local NGOs were chosen, varying from development agencies to human 
rights organizations, and based on the organizations willingness to interview. One or two 
professionals of those organizations were interviewed from each local organization. The 
NGOs that I was able to interview members from are Masr Al Kheir and the Education 
for Employment foundation in Egypt. These individuals are mostly formally educated, 
have relevant status within the organization, and will be early to middle aged Egyptian 
Men and Women. Fortunately this will allow for interviews to be conducted in both 
English and Arabic, as English is an official language of Egypt. All official languages are 
taught to some degree in public and certainly private schools, which is why a large 
portion of the educated population is familiar with French and English. As an Egyptian/ 
American, this will inevitably allow for the interview process to be simpler as far as 
communication is concerned. The primary concern, or risk, for these subjects are that 
these local NGO workers are members of the vast population of marginalized, naturally 
as they are regulated by government. 
International NGOs were chosen in varying sectors similar to the local NGOs, and 
include three organizations. These organizations are CARE Egypt, Plan Egypt, and Relief 
 60
Egypt. One to two individuals were interviewed from each organization. These 
individuals were Men and Women, formally educated, twenty-five years to middle-aged 
individuals who have had little to fear of the state until the recent upheaval. While there 
are several local Egyptians that are employed by INGOs, a common occurrence is that 
foreigners, particularly Westerners, receive better services, salary, and rights as staff 
members. These members of society are highly protected by the state, as in the case of 
CARE they are protected by presidential decree, and interviews with them should warrant 
minimal risk. Although the military may not like what these subjects may say, foreigners 
are not fully subjected to Egyptian law and are therefore also under the protection of their 
state of origin. 
In regards to USAID, it was my desire to interview at least two official current or 
retired USAID development workers in Egypt. However, I was restricted to one interview 
with a pivotal staff member of the controversial ‘Democracy and Governance’ sector of 
USAID. These officials have little to zero fear of the state; however, their reluctance to 
interview may be based on protocol of some kind. There are also many retired USAID 
officials who are now involved in other areas of the NGO sector in Egypt that I would 
like to interview if given permission to do so. I attempted to conduct interviews with 
members of the U.S. state department though this was a difficult process and resulted in 
zero interviewees. 
Development contractors work under similar circumstances as USAID staff 
members and are mostly made up of foreigners. I interviewed three development 
contractors that have worked for the development industry in Egypt for up to twenty 
years. They are protected both by their state of origin as well as the Egyptian government 
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because they work in tandem with the Egyptian state for development. Contractors work 
almost solely on USAID, WB, and IMF projects and therefore they coordinate closely 
with governmental institutions to implement structural adjustment policies. 
The ‘street’ portion of civil society includes my interviews with three activists 
that have vowed to preserve the purpose of the revolution and continue challenging the 
state. Furthermore, I interviewed two young women activists involved with various 
‘informal’ organizations that work to apply pressure on the state. This arguably included 
the most sensitive interviews and had to be handled with delicacy and care for their 
safeties and my own. The members of the youth coalition range from the ages of eighteen 
to thirty years old but will need the most care and sensitivity when interviewing. They 
sound older than “youth” but in reality they are still dependent individuals. They have 
lost friends throughout the duration of the revolution and have seen some difficult days 
from the security forces and members of the population. While most are formally 
educated, they are the most “informally” educated having lived their entire lives in a 
police state and under Mubarak’s authoritative rule. Several of the interview subjects 
asked to be anonymous following our meeting and therefore even the first names are 
rarely mentioned. 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to Subjects 
 
As an Egyptian/ American, born and raised in Cairo, I am fortunate enough to still 
have a majority of family still residing in Egypt. My personal connection to the 
community, along with my soon to be finalized Egyptian citizenship, the research 
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process, particularly how I obtained access to subjects, is sensitive for both local subjects 
and myself. To obtain these interviews I accessed a number of formal, informal, and 
previously connected networks. I formally contacted USAID and local/international 
NGOs in order to receive consent of these interviews. While there was some success 
from the formal route, there were available close ties to these individuals that I was able 
to contact. Additionally, I obtained many interviews using the snowball effect. Several 
interviewees were interested in the research enough to introduce me to various 
individuals involved with CSOs.  Personal acquaintances were made available as an 
urban youth in Cairo, from my parents as educators, from family members affiliated with 
NGOs and political parties, and my own connection of attending a high profile, private, 
international school that has allowed access to varying individuals from the relevant 
social groups. This school is where the children of USAID development workers, U.S. 
department of state officials, diplomats, ambassadors, and high-ranking government and 
military officials attend school. This fortunately has been a resourceful advantage for 
receiving the attention of these organizations, particularly because few of them are 
already established connections. Personal connections made it possible to meet with two 
organization officials and one of the local subjects. Otherwise, formal networks were 
made without previous association, while informal networks were made possible with the 
help of reliable informants through who I am personally connected. These informants are 
more than often a part of the organization and/or community of the subjects I intend to 
interview. As for the youth movement coalition, I have credible informants that provided 
individuals capable of performing interviews. Literally phone calls will be made to 
trusted informants to allow my presence among the youth members. Many individuals 
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had an interest to interview, as a tool for relaying their broader message, though I chose 
three key individuals. These activists have spent the majority of the past year in Tahrir 
square, the geographical symbol of the ‘street’ civil society and the location of where 
these relationships were established. 
 
Recruitment Procedure 
 
Participation of the subjects for interviews were obtained through the application 
of face-to-face requests, emails, phone calls, and snowball sampling. Original contacts 
required either one-phone call with informants and organizations or by email; however, 
in certain instances I formally approached organizations face-to-face to discuss the 
purpose of my study rather than carrying it out on the phone or by email. Particularly 
with the local population, people respond to face-to-face contact to properly assess the 
interaction in order to better judge my intentions as the interviewer. Still, the snowball 
sampling proved to be the most common form of recruiting interviewees. Snowball 
sampling provided a more comfortable setting with several individuals because of the 
vital application of trust between interviewees and myself.  
In the case that face-to-face contacts were not successful in obtaining 
interviewees, than these contacts would no longer be considered. Two forms of contact 
on a subject will be the limit because there are many available subjects within an 
organization that may be available. Similarly, organizations that passed on providing 
consent for interviews would not be contacted multiple times. There were several 
international and local NGOs to choose from that run on similar agendas, share similar 
purposes of function, and receive similar amounts of ridicule and regulation from the 
government. Within the Coptic Orthodox church and Mosque there are many spiritual 
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leaders, sheikhs/priests, who would have been open to a conversational discussion on 
what the future holds for Egyptian society. During the interview with a member of the 
MB, my informant Mahmoud (an aspiring journalist) provided the access and was vital to 
obtaining this interview with a generally closed society. All in all, many individuals from 
all social groups were willing to divulge in their own version of the state of Egyptian civil 
society. You see it on late night news stations, where there is an influx of heated social, 
economic, and political discussion between individuals on television or those who call in 
to join the conversation. It is clear that the majority of the population feels that they have 
a stake in the future process. This is why the recruitment procedure was not as difficult as 
expected. What was difficult: determining and clarifying the voices, individual opinions, 
and stances of the subjects within each social group interviewed. 
As far as receiving the necessary consent for the interview process, a form of 
written consent or vocal consent was provided for every possible subject. I also vocally 
presented the consent process in order to validate the subjects understanding of their 
individual rights within the interview. The forms were provided in both English and 
Arabic according to the subject’s ethnicity, although there was subjects who only 
received the consent form in either only English or Arabic, based on their linguistic 
background. In a few cases where informed consent from a subject was difficult to 
obtain, I replaced it with vocal consent. This was necessary due to the security situation, 
the perceived alienation of the subject for having to sign a document, as well as the social 
situation, for example if I were in front of multiple peers in the vicinity and had 
individuals sign a paper it will not be welcomed. If vocal consent was not provided then 
they were not able to participate. I made this fact known by simply explaining to them 
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my background as an Egyptian student who is performing research on the functions of the 
state along with the work of civil society. If they had little interest in participating or they 
were skeptical of the study, which was understandable, they were notified that the 
process was entirely voluntary. In the case that individuals were uncomfortable with 
specific questions, they were allowed to avoid questions and leave them unanswered at 
their request. 
 
Interview Procedure 
 
Subjects took part in a conversational experience with the aim of creating a 
comfortable environment. There was zero exposure to film, music, surveys, no 
experimental interventions or manipulations of any kind. Consent for voice recording 
interviews was made clear in person and entirely voluntary. Interviews were based 
around functions of employment, what the organization provides to the state, what their 
relationship with the government is like, the effects of government influence, their 
relationship with the people they serve, etc. these questions could be passed over in order 
to avoid putting the subject into an uncomfortable position. If there are conflicts of 
interest they were not a part of the questioning from the beginning. Local NGO workers 
appeared conscience of there choice of diction, however I made it clear that as long as 
anonymity is kept, their organization will not be put at risk based on their opinions of the 
government. Egyptians were not put at risk simply through my interviewing process. 
What would put subjects at risk is if there was reckless planning of the interview setting. 
This would only feel “risky” for individuals from the Youth movement, which is why 
they interviewed in low-key venues such as a cafe. Small, less public, privately owned 
cafés were a common setting for discussion and the interview process. The most vital 
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aspect of the interview process is that subjects were aware of why I am conducting this 
research. This is vital because, firstly, interviewees wanted to know my intentions- 
particularly during a difficult, transitional, volatile time in Egypt’s history, and especially 
if it will include controversially charged discussions. The intention was to make all 
subjects aware that they, and their affiliations, have a communal stake in creating a 
stronger nation post-Mubarak. The interview process allowed members of various groups 
the opportunity to express their own beliefs, reservations and hopes, their own 
organization’s relationships with other social groups, as well as the intentions of powerful 
forces within the state and civil society. By obtaining this research and the subject’s 
responses, future anthropologists, and anthropologists alike, will find it easier to 
distinguish the future trajectory of Egypt as an organized state, as a community of civil 
society, and governing entity. 
 
Potential Risks and Benefits to Subjects 
 
Potential risks to subjects are based around political interests and whether they are 
correctly representing the organization the subject represents. For international NGOs 
and USAID, there is a minimum to the risk they are subject to. Their highest risks are 
centered on discomfort through the asking of politically charged questions. Though they 
can voluntarily skip a question, loss of confidentiality can also be at risk for these 
subjects in case they are replying to a question independently of their organization’s 
beliefs. Local NGOs and members of the youth coalition are subject to the most potential 
risk during this research. As native Egyptians, they are at risk of offending the 
government, discomfort of interview could lead to a feeling of losing confidentiality, 
furthermore, even the educated Egyptian class are subjected to some form of social or 
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political marginalization. Questioning local NGOs on their opinions of governmental 
intervention and the USAID program would certainly help to create a charged 
conversation if not handled correctly. My questioning was worded sensitively and in 
ways that would be straightforward so that no misunderstandings or speculations were 
made based on heavily charged diction. Local organizations also have governmental 
influences lending to more reason why the questioning process had to be worked out 
thoroughly. It was important not to have assumptions within the questioning process. My 
questions inquired about relationships with other social forces, and the subject chose to 
elaborate on that accordingly. Also, much of the local urban population, in particular 
“active” individuals, did not seem to be scared, ashamed or discomforted by speaking 
openly about the government-within reason. This is a brand new development, since the 
revolution, that had the potential of changing on a case-by-case basis. Other individuals 
that could have been subjected to potential risks were my informants, many of whom I 
am personally connected. These informants, family friends, colleagues, and friends 
assisted with collecting some of the subject interviewees among the several parties that 
were interviewed. Though they were not as involved in any part of the interviewing 
process, it is vital that their anonymity is kept unless noted otherwise. 
In general, I hope that all subjects benefited from the interview process. 
Relationships were successfully built throughout the interview process, which is why the 
procedure is that critical. Every interview strived for a comfortable, casual, and honest 
atmosphere between the interviewee and myself. The subject from USAID did not overly 
benefit from the interview because of a strong ideological system that they have in place. 
Subjects who work for international and local NGOs will benefit from the interview 
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process simply as an interesting interview, one that will allow them to be reflective on 
their work and the surrounding community. Youth members of the ‘street’ can potentially 
benefit through the networking opportunity that will be presented. In general I want more 
from them than I will be able to provide to them, however, the interview process will 
benefit these individuals for the sake of reflecting on their present and future plans for 
civic action. As far as actual physical costs for subjects, they are minimal. Most of the 
costs will be in the form of time. I will make an effort for every interview to do the 
majority of traveling in order to reach the interviewees preferred area of Cairo. 
 
Minimization of Potential Risk 
 
As stated previously, there were potential risks and benefits that subjects could 
experience if the interviews occurred without the necessary briefing and questioning 
procedure. Subjects who have the protection of organizations, particularly NGOs and 
USAID, dealt with much less risk based on institutional protection. The members of these 
organizations also may benefit the least from the interview process because of their class 
and economic status. Subjects who have little to zero backing of organizations and are 
street protest participants of the Youth coalition were the highest potential risk but still 
benefit from the experience of speaking their mind and having someone listen. I believe 
this is a benefit because the work of the “activists” continues to bring awareness and 
advocacy to the original goals of the revolution. The risk involving these subjects were 
minimized firstly, by presenting a necessary briefing of why I am asking questions while 
providing necessary background information of myself in order to insure transparency. 
Secondly, subjects were notified that their answers would be anonymous based on 
preference and that they are voluntarily answering questions. Thirdly, I tried to stay away 
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from group discussions of any kind because of peer pressure, not only to say the correct 
statements but also to avoid any sort of political pressure that individuals feel from one 
another. Because there is a high source of political tension, the interview process was 
preferably based around one on one casual conversation so that subjects felt comfortable 
to speak their opinions. 
 
Positives, Limitations and Areas Missed 
 
There were several limitations during the research process that I will address here. 
Firstly, the limited time for research is a concern. I spent a total of three and a half 
months conducting interviews and obtaining research in Egypt and I believe with more 
time some limitations could have been avoided. Specifically in the case of the number of 
interviews conducted, reaching out to other relevant social forces of society, and 
spending more time obtaining interviews out of the country’s capital would have ensured 
an increase in depth and reflexivity of this anthropological study. Secondly, I was unable 
to reach any members of political society as I had originally intended. I could not 
organize interviews with members of the military due to the current state of affairs. Their 
voice and opinion of civil society would have been useful. Another limitation was the 
language and ethnicity barrier. Though this was rarely an issue, the fact that I am an 
Egyptian of mixed descent rather than full-blooded may inevitably attributed to a few 
setbacks. Trust, a valuable mechanism between the interviewee and interviewer, did not 
turn out to be serious issue. Although being ethnically half-American (Caucasian) in my 
opinion resulted in specific interviewees feeling uneasy about carrying on a conversation 
on their political discourse. Moreover, in order to ensure the one hundred percent correct 
use and translation of Egyptian Arabic a friend and fluent speaker accompanied me 
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during a few interviews that were conducted only in Arabic. While I interviewed 
individuals in Arabic on my own, I still felt it to be important to ensure there would be no 
linguistic miscues during the interview process, although I was concerned another 
individual with me would add anxiety.  
A few members of local NGOs also were not interested in being interviewed or 
discussing civil society’s role within the state. An example of this is in my attempt to 
reach out to priests from the Coptic Church. I eventually interviewed six members of the 
Coptic Orthodox church however I spent the majority of my time ensuring them that 
recordings and identities would not be exposed to the public, as they rightfully appeared 
skeptical about presenting their political opinions to anyone let alone someone of mixed 
descent. Another limitation was that I attempted to reach several members of the U.S. 
State Department in Egypt and was rejected unanimously. I continue to feel curious about 
why members of a foreign entity happened to be the least transparent. Lastly, this thesis 
is meant to describe civil society in Egypt as a whole; however none of the conducted 
interviews were located outside of Egypt’s major urban centers of Cairo and Alexandria. 
While most NGOs and social forces of “formal” civil society are based out of Egypt’s 
urban centers there are certainly active elements of their work in rural areas. Also, 
‘informal’ civil society is extremely active in less urban regions of the nation, in 
particular for the causes of the Nubian population in Upper Egypt as well as the Bedouin 
population in the Sinai Peninsula. 
While there were several limitations, the research process produced many positive 
results. Firstly, I was introduced to wonderful people using the snowball effect. Some 
interviewees were able to facilitate meetings for myself with other members of their 
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organization or of another organization. Fortunately, initial interviewees were considerate 
and introduced me to highly relevant and active individuals who maintained a rich, 
qualitative understanding of Egyptian civil society and roles of major CSOs. The 
interview process also provides excellent contacts post-research for when I am back in 
the country. Finally, another positive is that although not all the interviews conducted 
were utilized for this paper, all the results had an ultimate effect on the re-conceptualizing 
of civil society. Besides the social forces discussed throughout the analysis I interviewed 
religious institutions (members of both the Mosque and the Church), staff members from 
the United Nations Development Program in Cairo, as well as a member of the MB. The 
interviews were relevant and provided useful insight and future references. 
Next, this section will highlight several topics that were avoided throughout this 
thesis for several reasons. No reason however was for the sole purpose of ignoring 
important issues; rather my research did not permit the inclusion of specific topics due to 
time constraints and the limited number of interviews.  Firstly, activists are not the sole 
form of pure civil society though they are a primary example and source of civil society 
work. Labor unions, which were not discussed in my research, have an extremely 
influential role in Egyptian society, as they are active in applying pressure on the private 
sector and government.  There are state run and independent labor unions that are 
especially vital in the recent social movements throughout Egypt. Factory workers are 
utilized for mass protests and are capable of severely crippling state owned industries. 
Labor unions are quite possibly the necessary force for destabilizing and applying 
pressure on the government pre and post revolution.  Additionally there are artists, 
political cartoonists, anarchists and many small, informal but organized groups that take 
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pride in challenging the state in a less direct manner. Graffiti artists for example provide 
the story of the movement on public wall space throughout Cairo and on most state-
owned buildings. Graffiti plays a key role in taking up public space to spread a message 
to all who can see it. Even if the state washes away anti-government graffiti, there is 
always someone who will repaint another message. 
I failed to mention the role of religious institutions on civil society. The members 
of these religious institutions provided useful information during the interviews; 
however, it was clear that they tried to exclude themselves from the political realm. They 
are active in society and certainly provide elements of financial, moral, and religious 
support to their constituents. Mosques and Churches still encourage individuals to take 
part in nation’s political process but are clearly not interested in challenging government. 
Priests and Sheikhs use their influence to encourage positive change; nevertheless, these 
institutions are more concerned about stability, safety, and security for their constituents- 
particularly for the minority of Christians.   During my sole interview with a member of 
the formerly illegal Muslim Brotherhood, civil society was referenced using dual 
definitions. In one way the doctor understood civil society as “activity and mobilization 
on the ground” until civil society became a reference for the “civil” state that will come 
to fruition under the rule of the MB. Either way, it is important to reference other 
differing contexts of the use of the term civil society outside of how I have previously 
described misinterpretations of the term. Lastly, I was unable to discuss the heavy 
influence the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has had on ‘informal’ civil society which I 
consider to be legitimate civil society. The MB, over the past decades, has developed a 
strong following among lower-income constituents. Their methods include providing 
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social services in the form of health and education, religious teachings, and charity. The 
MB formerly associated in “the street” and successfully garnered support by large 
portions of the population due to the services they provide. Since the government had 
been terrible at providing services, the MB for some time received praise and support for 
their civil society work. However, it is worth noting that receiving support through 
services to the poor can be interpreted as a form of manipulation. This can be seen as 
manipulation due to the MB’s ascendance to power following the uprising and their 
ability to receive votes from the rural, low-income constituents that they served. 
Furthermore this form of civil society work is similar to the concept of charity and 
provides a short-term solution. Their inclusion in this research is due to their newly 
created role of leading government and their now dominance of political society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis: Not what it seems 
 
 
Beginning on the 25th of January 2011, something groundbreaking, some may call 
earth, or state, and even socio-politically shattering happened; it was surreal. But in fact 
this was the realest occurrence that happened in greater Cairo, Alexandria, and many 
surrounding cities, since I cannot even recall, or at least since fast-food delivery became 
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possible. An event, or a string of events, rather a movement exponentially erupted 
throughout the plethora of nook and cranny streets of Egyptian cities everywhere, 
resembling the pumping of a thousand blood vessels reaching the heart or meeting place. 
Some say they could not have, in their wildest dreams, believed this was possible; others 
simply give the facts behind why the largest movement of civic engagement and protest 
against the state since Saad Zaghloul in 1919, was happening, or depending on whom you 
speak with, is still happening. Just months earlier, the people of Tunisia rose up in acts of 
civil disobedience in a cry for ‘a better life’ with the result of the toppling of ex-President 
Ben Ali, who when given the chance, fled to Saudi Arabia with his family and his tail 
between his legs. Was this what Egyptians wanted? I mean who knows what anyone 
wants when a president is deified as a Pharaoh, has the backing of a ‘popular’ military 
dictatorship, managed to continuously rule for thirty years, and appeared more concerned 
about retaining the executive, legislative, and judicial power within his military trained 
fist clench rather than do his best to… Apologies, here I am venting and rambling, but I 
have a point. What exactly was it that allowed for such a fervent, socio-economically 
diverse collective of individuals to organize such grand events, the main-event of our 
generation, a political storm following three decades of relatively calm waves of 
complacency? And more importantly, who are these people? Who are they affiliated 
with? Who do they represent? Is this Egyptian civil society at it’s finest? Who is part of 
civil society and who is not? And come to think about it where were the NGOs, the 
CSOs, the donors offering funds, the assistance from civil society in order to counter-
balance the political chaos, and the government’s work, or lack thereof? 
One year later, over one thousand Egyptian deaths, even more injuries, supposed 
sectarian violence, state sponsored violence, ousting of Hosni Mubarak along with his 
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National Democratic Party, and the state is still in disarray. I found myself attending the 
one-year anniversary of the revolution in the epicenter of Cairo, Tahrir Square.  Nearly 
one million strong in the country’s capital and the revolution felt all but finished. The 
scent of teargas was not available to torment civilians, the images of police and military 
were non-existent; the passionate, revolutionary spirit felt fresh- as if I had never been in 
the U.S. studying the year before. While some groups treated the day as a time to 
celebrate, many felt that the trials and tribulations of Egyptian citizens were beginning to 
seem like a lost cause, as if the revolution had not been realized. Besides the ousting of 
Mubarak and members of his authoritarian regime, they were right, much had gone 
unchanged.   
The post-revolution era undoubtedly opened the door wide open for this project, 
as my interviewees are conducted with controversial and influential members of society. 
It just so happens that people want to talk now, a lot. It’s not that this wasn’t the case 
before; on the contrary, Egyptians are highly social. However, the political realm has 
always been a sector of society to be set aside, to not question in fear of going mad over 
the illogical leadership that has ensued the past several decades. I set out to my home 
country with a question in mind. This question needed to be asked, discussed, and 
internalized, but by whom?  
For this section, and the ultimate purpose of my research, I provide the analytical 
framework for answering THE question of interest- what civil society is in Egypt. Civil 
society is an inevitable keyword in the globalizing process of ‘democratization’, whether 
through policy or academia. The term civil society has developed into a theoretically 
integral aspect of “democracy” as well as for describing “the local”. It is often believed 
that empowering civil society is equivalent to empowering ‘the local’, with the hope that 
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seeds for democracy are planted. This analytical process will explore the ambiguity of 
civil society, particularly in the case of Egypt, and will discuss the conceptualizing of 
such a socially and politically charged term.  By presenting my research findings, which I 
conducted throughout Cairo and includes the voices of various dominating social forces 
of the state and supposed civil society, I hope to bring to light the questions surrounding 
what Egyptian civil society is, especially if it is indeed a policy tool for the 
democratization process. I had the opportunity to reach several influential members of so-
called civil society, asking them similar questions on what their opinions were of the 
sector, whether they were apart of it, the importance of it in Egypt, while interlinking the 
political context of the revolution and the newly founded government. 
I will discuss and analyze the varying opinions on what Egyptian civil society 
while utilizing several narratives from the interviews I conducted with what I consider to 
be the major social forces of this sector.  These social forces are have the most influence 
on civil society and include the following groups, international NGOs (INGOs), local 
NGOs, foreign governments or affiliates (Aid, Development contractors), and a group of 
activists that represent, more or less, “the street”. Interviews were also conducted with 
members of religious institutions as well as with a member of the MB though their 
responses will be utilized differently. The second section will also discuss the affiliation 
between the previous groups that I have mentioned and the Egyptian government. 
Finally, the final section of my analysis will explore and discuss a re-conceptualization of 
Egyptian civil society, with the help of James Ferguson, while presenting an original civil 
society diagram/model. 
 
Egyptian Civil Society’s thoughts on Egyptian Civil Society 
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Here I present my findings on what CSO’s, governmental affiliates, informal 
organizations and unaffiliated, independent members of ‘the street’ believe to be civil 
society. This is an important finding for the overall discussion on Egyptian civil society, 
as you will find that there is indeed an identity crisis that needs sorting, and whom better 
to debate the topic than with influential members or affiliates of the supposed Egyptian 
civil society sector. Voices from within the state are the most vital, if not knowledgeable, 
however, keep in mind the traditional, theoretical definition of civil society while 
analyzing the functions of civil society organizations in reality and in practice. 
 
a. International NGO’s 
 
What do prominent international NGOs think is civil society, and do they believe 
their own organizations are a part of it? I was able to reach the staff of a few 
organizations based in Cairo but that do a majority of their work in rural Egypt, namely, 
CARE Egypt, Plan Egypt, and Relief International. Through an interview process, which 
often took place at the organization’s headquarters, I received the opinions of several 
high-ranking staff members on what they thought of Egyptian civil society, how they 
were involved with it, and whether they consider themselves to be a part of it. What 
seems to be a fairly simple and straightforward question has obviously opened the doors 
to several deeper issues, mostly being an identity confusion crisis. Responses from this 
mixed group of men and women either appear to be specific, rehearsed definitions of 
what civil society is in theory, or, they provide an answer that reflects confusion in their 
own belief of this sector of society. 
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CARE, based in Cairo for approximately sixty-five years, emerged in Egypt back 
in the early era of ‘development and cooperation’ between the west and ‘developing’ 
nations. The organization’s interests began due to the humanitarian crisis in Palestine, 
and later evolving to the long-term, sustainable development agenda. Over the past few 
decades CARE has grown to become a partnership organization that looks to play an 
intermediary role for other local partners, as “typically local partners will do between 
twenty five percent and seventy percent of the work, depending on their strengths and 
objectives”, the country director explained. They work in four separate programs on 
women’s rights, governance, agriculture and natural resources, and female education with 
the primary focus being on women and youth. The man I spoke to in particular is the 
office’s country director, meaning he runs the organization and is the primary resource 
for the international headquarters. He was an extremely kind hearted American man who 
lived in Cairo as a child and came back to work later in his life and has continued to do so 
for some time. I then proceeded to ask him the big question, what does this development 
professional think is Egyptian civil society? 
 
“I really question what a lot of Egyptian NGOs, and CDOs (community 
development organizations), CDA’s, I really question whether many of those 
organizations are really civil society. Often they have a founding member, they’re 
more a charitable organization at the local level, so they don’t really represent 
anybody, they don’t do any lobbying or advocacy, they collect food for people, 
they do various small projects for local communities, but often it is headed by a 
single person. They are staffed by volunteers, there is nothing particularly 
sustainable about it, and when the money runs out or the person loses interest, the 
CDO folds. So civil society in Egypt, I would say is pretty weak. I’d say it’s 
composed of professional NGOs who are self-sustaining and have resources, 
through donors (private or institutional) or their own resources, to carry on 
programs. Also international NGOs, lobby advocacy groups, such as women’s 
rights groups, environmental groups, and children’s rights groups. It’s a very 
small group in Egypt, real civil society, because my definition would be a group 
that is formed on a permanent basis that represents a certain constituency, and 
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works on different levels to support that constituency. Often it would be a 
constituency that doesn’t have a voice somehow. It doesn’t have to be, but I think 
that the idea of true civil society is to represent people, and to act as a bridge 
between the government and local people in some area or some areas. And in 
Egypt, that doesn’t happen very often. Some international NGOs, larger national 
NGOs, and larger Local NGOs would be my narrow definition of civil society. 
Concerning charity organizations, are they really civil society? To me, you don’t 
want to make the definition too broad because then it just becomes nothing. The 
other problem here with civil society is that the government regulates and 
controls all national NGOs very tightly. So when they are actually giving money 
to local NGOs, which they actually do to every NGO that is registered with the 
Ministry of Social Development gets money from the ministry, so therefore it is 
very questionable… if that is the money that enables them to survive, then they 
cannot be civil society and instead are actually arms of the government.” 
 
By the time he was finished answering the question we both seemed to express 
confusion, he didn’t know if I wanted more out of the answer or whether he should just 
keep exploring the idea.  His response reflects the many problems I mentioned 
previously. Firstly, that the diluting and broad usage of civil society will certainly weaken 
the sector, secondly, that he questions whether organizations posing as civil society are 
really civil society, thirdly, that international NGOs, or transnational organizations, 
should be included as a part of Egyptian civil society, and lastly, that nearly all formal 
local NGOs are regulated tightly- which includes the funds that they are able to receive 
from donors, therefore essentially existing as a governmental non-governmental 
organization. In response to my question of whether CARE was a part of Egyptian civil 
society, he responded, “We try very hard to be part of civil society… yes we say we are. 
I’m biased of course.” This point would confirm that he believes that member 
international organizations of the transnational sector are at the same time a valuable 
member of Egyptian civil society. Being my first interview with an international 
organization, I figured responses would be rather similar, with different variations of 
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course. However my initial thoughts did not hold true as I continued on to conduct the 
next interview with PLAN Egypt’s country director. 
 
Plan Egypt is an international NGO that works in seventy different countries. 
Their programs, like CARE, are committed to child and women development, active 
citizenship, and community organization. Speaking with the country director, Edward, 
who is also an American, there were some differing opinions to that of CARE. When I 
asked him to define Egyptian civil society for me, he responded by saying, 
 
“It’s the space that’s not government, but also not business or private sector. If 
you are working in a big business that’s not civil society. But they are promoting 
the concept of citizenship more than civil society because citizens that are in 
government might actually be Muslim Brotherhood, and if you work in a business 
like Google, and afterhours you are on Tahrir square. So, whether you are 
organized or not, this idea of citizenship and how rights are respected in a 
country is another concept. But for us, civil society is still the most common term 
for allowing people to associate, organize, around their own issues, as well as 
advocate for minority based issues.” 
 
On whether Plan Egypt is a part of Egyptian Civil society he quickly proclaimed that they 
are not, instead he asserted, “Ok, as an international NGO, we support local civil society 
but we are not actually part of it, because almost by definition civil society is indigenous. 
We are not even too sure on how to define ourselves, but we are here to support civil 
society.” He, and the mission of Plan Egypt, is to strengthen civil society, not to be a part 
of it. He makes it clear that Egyptian civil society must be inherently Egyptian or 
indigenous. This brings several intriguing thoughts to mind: how can these organizations 
strengthen civil society, as if to say they are “above” or “outside” of the sphere and are 
simply mechanics working to fix the problem? They have a local presence, hire Egyptian 
nationals, and receive enough funding from their donors to carry out their work in a 
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sustainable fashion, and yet they seem to believe they are outside of this realm, as if they 
only provide positive assistance. By the time I completed the second interview with the 
international NGO sector, I realized that I heard two different responses to what civil 
society is in Egypt, and furthermore, civil society was defined again from a broad to a 
specific form:  “promoting citizenship to the space where people are allowed to associate 
and organize.” However, this definition can be misleading because if Egyptian civil 
society is a place where people are allowed to “associate, and organize around their own 
issues”, then how is it that an international NGO is able to strengthen this sector? By 
promoting citizenship, and building capacity of local organizations, etc. this implies that 
Egyptians are incapable of organizing themselves, besides a lack of funding, this is not 
necessarily the case. 
Relief International, based in Cairo, is a newly established international 
organization that I was able to organize an interview with. The interview consisted of 
four Egyptian staff members, two men and two women, including the country director. 
They were open, transparent and invited me in to their apartment style office with open 
arms to meet with the vital members of their staff. All four members, throughout the 
duration of the interview were opinionated, knowledgeable, experienced, and at times 
disagreed over what constituted as Egyptian civil society. When I went ahead and asked 
them their opinion on what civil society in Egypt was, they each provided elaborate 
responses and plenty more than the previous interviews. Still, the confusion over what 
appears to be a commonly used phrase and question, “what is Egyptian civil society?” is 
perhaps the central catalyst for my thesis inquiries. This extremely helpful group of 
Egyptian development workers provided a wide array of examples of the varying levels 
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of civil society, yet, debated over what constitutes as a CSO and what CSO’s do as 
Egyptian civil society immediately took over the discussion. 
The country director began by saying: 
 
“Let me start, I would say civil society are not government, not military, and not 
business. That is civil society for me, it is not a government organization, business 
orientated or military.” 
 
A simple yet elegant reply was to be expected from the elder leader in the office. 
Immediately after, the second man responded quickly and quietly by saying, 
 
“It is a medium for community participation, it is sometimes organized and 
sometimes not. It can be a movement, or a popular committee, or a group of 
people that have a purpose for action, or an organization.” 
 
He was then quick to add that he would “like to differentiate that charitable 
organizations, mostly religious- Muslim or Christian- and sometimes secular work, there 
are human rights organizations, there are syndicates, they are all doing different work 
but they are all considered part of Egyptian civil society. Speaking about Egyptian civil 
society I have not mentioned any INGOs. INGOs are contributing to Egyptian civil 
society financially, technically, and capacity building but most probably as INGOs work 
differently- empowering civil society, empowering local groups, for them to help local 
groups and communities. UN is civil society, USAID is civil society, for us they are not 
Egyptian government, they are not local NGOs, they are Egyptian NGOs- there are 
different categories but we can consider them as catalysts.” 
Eager to jump an experienced development worker, she said, “Organizations that 
are not military, government, or business. However in Egypt there are heavily regulated 
organizations by the government. Although they are not government, every step 
everything inside is very much looked at by government so they are not as free as other 
CSOs in other countries- so there is a strong government presence whether we like it or 
not and most CSOs are on the side of charitable organizations, for many of them they 
don’t know the difference between charity work, development work, or political work, or 
rights based. So for me civil society in Egypt, there biggest problem is not that we don’t 
have one, we have one of the largest presence of Civil society organizations its more of a 
question of how the government controls them, what they are actually working in, and 
their understanding of what they should be able to do as civil society.” 
 
After pausing shortly she came back to add that her personal opinion was that 
 
“USAID is not civil society, that’s pure government and it is part of the state 
department so it’s purely political, it’s here for political reasons so it’s very 
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subject to what it wants to do. So in my personal opinion is it’s doing things for 
civil society but its jurisdiction is political. In 2006 when it became part of the 
state department, it’s no longer separated from the political agenda of the 
country- and that was a big change for USAID in the world.” 
 
With little else to say afterwards, the fourth employee chose to move on to the next 
question, saying she agreed with all that was said by her previous colleague. Still, their 
responses continued to reflect the essential debate of who is a part of civil society. The 
debate over whether USAID was a member of Egyptian civil society is clearly relevant as 
they fund and sustain several international and local organizations. To say that they were 
not a member of civil society would be questionable as they are providing the necessary 
funds to the organizations they choose- but this is all wrong. They are a part of the U.S. 
government. USAID funds are guided by the agenda of the U.S. state department and 
they come from the pockets of American taxpayers. They cannot possibly be considered 
Egyptian civil society even though they fund a large portion of it. One thing is clear, each 
response included a broad, all encompassing definition of civil society before each 
became hyper specific, even differentiating charity organizations (a vast portion of 
supposed CSO’s) from the sector. 
Mohsen went on and explained, “There was a study issued on the year 2000 by an 
American living in Egypt, his name is Mr. Robert LaTowsky. He did a study about CSO’s 
and divided them into three sectors- primary (grassroots), intermediary, and tertiary 
sectors. It is a very nice study, and I recommend it.” Mr. Robert LaTowsky 
compartmentalized the NGO sector in Egypt. The primary NGOs are considered 
grassroots and are the organizations dealing first hand in providing services. Intermediary 
NGOs, which are most INGOs, are organizations that don’t carry out services 
themselves, instead they work alongside primary NGOs and provide the necessary 
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financial, technical assistance. INGOs no longer are the direct provider of services to the 
local people. Thirdly, tertiary NGOs are made up of advocacy groups and CSO’s that are 
providing awareness of human rights and other relevant social issues. He was an 
intriguing and helpful character although his work was mainly focused on the NGO 
sector as a whole, leaving out many of the organizations that are informal and un-
registered. 
Finally, I was able to reach and interview a veteran development worker in Egypt, 
an American who has spent time working for several non-profits in Egypt, Dan Coster. 
With the snowball effect able produce most of my interviews; Dan was one who was 
willing and able to introduce me to colleagues in different CSO’s. In the comfort of his 
apartment flat I went ahead and asked him the golden question. He responded first by 
saying that the: 
 
“Organizations I’ve directly worked with in this country have been Care, Care 
International, RTI (Research Triangle International), and AIR (American Institute 
for Research). So all three organizations are international in nature and therefore 
from what I’ve said previously, I do not consider them as civil society 
organizations. But, I consider them integral to strengthening civil society in 
Egypt.” 
 
He then jumped at the opportunity to define civil society in Egypt, saying: 
 
“Purely, civil society, I feel is ownership. Could be at a community or district, 
national, levels. Civil society is ownership, its accountability, and holding the 
government accountable; and ownership in its pure stage needs to be local. So 
you’ve got international players and you’ve got UN players, all kinds of 
stakeholders in the strength of civil society, but what is civil society? I think its 
local organizations. I have been working with the community level. But to sustain 
things at the community level, but to sustain at this level, obviously the 
environment is linked to government. CSOs are organizations and people of 
influence, organizations that are influential and local in nature, and that work 
from the community to district or governorate or to the national level. Harnessing 
people’s interests, their demands, exerting their influence on government so that 
they can provide services.” 
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Following his response, I asked him if to be part of civil society you have to be a local? 
And what line divides you from being a part of civil society or not? He retorted by 
saying: 
 
“Well I think, International entities, their mandate is things like poverty 
alleviation, human dignity, bringing marginalized people up. But the way they do 
that is through, their strategy, is to implement projects that are linked to their 
long-term strategy. I see these entities they enter life and then they exit, in other 
words they serve as a catalyst. I don’t think that if these organizations are part of 
civil society that means they’re the ones that need to change things. I think they 
are change organizations but what they do is they enable local populations to 
change things, so that when they exit, if there’s nothing sustained upon their 
leaving, and then I’d think that it’s a big waist of time. If they’re the ones who are 
responsible for the long term, they are responsible to be a catalyst and enable 
organizations, so that when they leave, the people can demand and hold power 
and government accountable. So if you take your eye off of that ball and you say 
‘no we are the civil society organizations and we make change’ rather than being 
the catalyst, alright well you’ll make some change but I don’t think it will be half 
as sustainable or half as long term impactful as it needs to be.” 
 
Making a compelling argument, Dan explained the difference between catalyst 
organizations that empower and help develop civil society and actual Egyptian CSOs. 
While indeed a necessary differentiation, his response still emphasized the influence that 
international entities have on the local population with the strategy and agenda of the 
foreign donor. Again, civil society is referred to as being constructed from “abroad” or 
from “outside of the state” as “catalyst” organizations, which are not CSOs but work to 
empower CSOs. 
What is clear from these international NGO workers is that they are not 
completely sure who or what makes up Egyptian civil society. Certain interviewees were 
adamant about considering their respective organizations as Egyptian civil society and 
others felt their organization worked from outside to strengthen civil society. Either way 
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there is divided responses among the international NGO community as these 
organizations emphasize “locality”, being “indigenous”, and holding government 
accountable, functions that INGOs do not necessarily commit to. 
 
b. Local NGO 
 
Now lets look at the opinions of a few members of local NGOs and discuss what 
they had to say on civil society. The first Egyptian NGO that I was able to meet through a 
family connection is Masr Al Kheir. In a particularly professional setting, I interviewed 
the director of fundraising of the organization along with a sidekick of his, who either had 
no title or forgot to mention it. This NGO is a large non-profit organization that works in 
a wide range of development fields for the betterment of the Egyptian people. This 
organization is certainly a leader in their field as they are able to receive funds locally, to 
sustain themselves, and are widely visible in the media with a commercial presence. 
Their message is broad and all encompassing, they want to “develop people…improve 
the socio economic status of individuals and groups” as the two gentleman I met with 
proclaimed. However, it is difficult to compare this NGO to other local NGOs due to the 
difference in size, capacity, and funds. In many cases Masr al Kheir is one of handful 
sustainable organizations of this size, but do they function in a civil society dominated by 
transnational organizations and government restriction? The answer is yes.  I asked both 
of them what they thought of civil society in Egypt and whether they believe they are a 
part of it. Needless to say I received a limited response. This is what they said: 
 
“M1: “Anything but the government… multi-national companies, it’s like an NGO for the 
welfare of society.” 
 
M2: “I look at it the same, anyone that is concerned with the development of humanity.“ 
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On whether they considered themselves to be a part of civil society: 
 
“M1 and M2: Yes, we are a leading NGO.” 
 
They considered all of society, outside of the government, that was concerned for the 
development of Egypt and humanity as a whole. Quite a wide range to choose from, what 
is the indicator for “concern of humanity”. We all individually care about society to a 
certain level, with exceptions of course, however how do we know CSO’s are conducting 
the necessary functions of civil society and vouching for Egyptian society? Additionally, 
they seemed to include the business sector into civil society, which was not uncommon to 
find amongst my research, although it is questionable to me how developed the practices 
of corporate social responsibility are amongst the private sector. Similarly, the private 
sector provides limited funding, on a whole, to civil society. Still, I will agree that for 
many organizations, funding is funding and can be the difference to whether an 
organization can continue functioning or not. Ultimately, it was a limited response to the 
civil society question, indicating the similar trend of this strange ambiguity of a sector 
that has received millions of dollars domestically and abroad, mostly abroad, to develop 
the very sector we find ourselves lost in. 
The next local NGO worker I was fortunate to interview works for an 
organization called Education for Employment in Egypt. Meeting with this young 
woman, in her mid twenties, was indeed a refreshing change of pace from the older 
generation I had been meeting with consistently for months. She gladly went right into 
the discussion on civil society saying: 
 
“Civil society is public opinion, or the street, as part of civil society. NGOs 
definitely, the social forces that may not always be organized, for example certain 
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minorities, Christians, women, entities that cohesively represent a certain voice in 
society but aren’t always organized, I think they factor in. So I think civil society 
is the social balance to the politics of government, I kind of think of their role as 
in the socio-economic sphere.” 
 
Her answer remained consistent with other responses though she brings up some 
interesting points.  Firstly, she mentions “the street” and “entities that cohesively 
represent a certain voice in society but aren’t always organized”- it seems to me that she 
is, rightfully, including much of civil society that may not be represented by CSOs, or the 
informal sector.  Secondly, she mentions that civil society is “the social balance to 
politics of government” working mainly in the socio-economic sphere as she refers to the 
sector’s role in development and improving socio-economic status of individuals and 
groups. Still, in the eyes of local NGO workers, one can see how these responses are 
often outside of the political realm and mainly concerned with economic development, 
much like the work of charity organizations and most NGOs both local and international. 
Then I asked her if she considered her organization to be a part of Egyptian civil society 
along with whether for-profit organizations are civil society. She quickly responded 
saying, 
 
“Yes definitely. I think its interesting because we are noticing a shift in Egypt and 
globally towards social entrepreneurship, social finance, CSR, and I think that is 
making for profit businesses more part of civil society but I think in of in itself not 
necessarily.” 
 
Again, she makes it clear that the private sector has a role to play within civil society. 
This is certainly true considering the lack in funding and overall capacity for CSOs, still, 
there seems to be a trend that civil society is less involved in political development as it is 
with economic development. 
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Local NGOs, particularly those I have interviewed, seem to rely their focus on the 
socio-economic arena to avoid heavy government regulation. There are charity 
organizations, those interested in education and health services, corporate social 
responsibility, and a limited number of locally registered NGOs outside of this realm.  
They avoid political development and have little interest in challenging government, 
knowing that their organization’s existence relies on consent from government, or 
political society.  While the work of these organizations can be successful with plenty of 
positive results, it appears that NGOs will always be employed within the socio-
economic sector because of deteriorating economic conditions, rather than lobbying and 
challenging the government or political status-quo (arguably the entity to blame for 
socio-economic deterioration). 
 
c. Foreign Governments 
 
In a fortunate circumstance, I was finally able to reach a member of the U.S. 
government, more specifically a member of USAID, a primary donor for CSO’s in Egypt. 
USAID is funded by American taxpayers and works according to the agenda and interests 
of the U.S. state department. Basically they are a full-fledged foreign government 
organization that has had an influential hand in the development field as well as Egyptian 
civil society. Many organizations could not survive without the funding received from 
USAID. 
On a this hot summer afternoon, a day after the supposed ‘crisis’ involving 
protesters at the U.S. Embassy on the anniversary of the September 11th attacks, I met a 
high ranking official in the Democracy and Governance sector of USAID. We intended 
for the interview to convene within the U.S. compound, which looks like a fortress and is 
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one of the largest USAID headquarters worldwide, however they would not allow me to 
bring my cell phone or recording equipment. Instead we went for a walk, perhaps 
fittingly to the Cinnabon around the corner to discuss the matters of Egyptian civil 
society. 
I asked him what he thought of Egyptian civil society, whether he considered 
international NGOs to be Egyptian civil society, and ultimately ended with whether 
USAID, with all the funding they give to Egyptian civil society, should be considered to 
be a part of that sector (mostly for laughs). 
 
“Well, by definition it’s any non-governmental actor. So, it starts on community 
organizations, and just a bunch of people getting together for whatever reason, 
whether religious or non religious, and it goes all the way up to the most 
organized civil society organizations that have funds from 10 different donors that 
have implementing for 50 years. And of course there are international 
organizations as well that are falling into those categories. And there are other 
CSO’s in areas that are involved in political areas or close to political areas, 
community empowerment, human rights, and you have other organizations that 
are very non-political, apolitical and they are focused on service delivery, health, 
education, you know.” 
 
On whether he considers international organizations to be a part of Egyptian civil society: 
 
“Yeah, some people do and some people don’t. It is strange, it’s the basic 
question of what is civil society, so many different interpretations, and so when 
you start off with that premise being so different, it’s hard to then draw some firm 
conclusions, because if everybody starts at a different premise and then they go 
off in a different direction.” 
 
On whether he considers USAID to be any part of Egyptian civil society? 
 
“No, we don’t consider ourselves a part of Egyptian civil society, I mean it is a 
part of the United States government, and so what USAID’s position is in both 
Egypt and around the world is that civil society organizations as well as inside 
the US can play a vital role in helping to provide services to people, to help 
empower people, to build their capacity, to meet basic needs of human beings and 
of advancing civil society in various ways. So, we ourselves are trying to help 
facilitate that but we’re not part of that. Of course our role has been highly 
controversial.” 
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USAID is not a member of Egyptian civil society though the sector receives heavy 
funding from them. This of course has implications as their funding is used as a tool to 
steer or guide the nation in their direction, as they believe that empowering civil society 
results in democratization. However, many organizations that receive their funding will 
not perform the function of civil society, for instance holding government accountable. 
Rather, it appears that USAID is content “buying” off organizations that will act as civil 
society instead of actually empowering civil society. 
Fortunately, I was able to interview two development contractors in Egypt that are 
employed by mostly for-profit development companies that work and implement USAID 
projects. Both have worked for several years with a number of organizations in Egypt, 
international NGOs and for-profit development companies that ultimately implement 
USAID projects in various socio-economic areas. 
First we have Pete, an American development contractor who happened to be 
without work at the time of the interview. He was open and helpful during the interview 
even when dealing with several controversial questions.  I asked him what he considered 
to be civil society, and quite simply, he wasn’t sure. 
 
“That’s why I had to ask because I’m not quite sure. I mean all the companies for 
profit have an effect on society, they are big, they are here, and regardless of 
what they are doing with their profits they definitely have an effect on society. 
Civil society I mean I would take out the government I guess, but I would include 
for-profit companies.” 
 
Next I spoke with another development contractor who now works as a 
development consultant in various economic fields. This was his response when I asked 
him to explain to me Egyptian civil society: 
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“To me civil society is, typically, non-governmental organizations that work in 
anything from classic development activities that could be related to education, 
literacy, agriculture, public health issues, and other issues that are important to 
society outside the realm of the formal government arena. Community groups, 
like-minded groups that come together and focus on issues.” 
 
Then he responded to my question regarding whether his work is part of civil society, 
saying: 
 
“We’ve worked with Egyptian organizations that you can say are part of civil 
society, in a broad sense. For example, we work with associations frequently. 
Those associations can be small farmer associations, which are organized under 
the civil society law- under the ministry of social affairs (or solidarity). Those are 
community organizations focusing on how they can work together for the benefit 
of all the farmers involved to make more money through the production of better 
fruits and vegetables. Other colleagues work with how they can manage and 
strengthen that association so that they can better serve its members of the 
community. In the past I’ve worked with the Egyptian Chefs association who work 
in hotels, resorts, restaurants. But again, around this mission of professional 
development, to help chefs be better chefs- the other one was to help farmers be 
better farmers. That also included technical assistance with the association so 
that it could better manage itself and better serve its members.” 
 
Speaking with these development contractors led me to a few relevant points. One point 
is that the definition of civil society in Egypt continues to be difficult to define. One of 
them wasn’t sure how to define it by admitting his lack of knowledge of the sector. The 
second interview indicates that when his company does work with civil society it is 
focused entirely in the socio-economic realm, primarily promoting neoliberal economic 
principles (i.e. Structural adjustment programs) of the ‘West’, WB, and IMF. 
 
d. Activists and Initiatives 
 
Next on the list of interviewees comes a group of individuals who find themselves 
involved in several areas tied to “the local”. They are the ones who work informally, 
mostly with little funding beyond what they are able to muster from their side jobs, 
without an office, without a financial motive, and with the intention of challenging a 
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government that has made life difficult in a multitude of areas for the majority of the 
population. This group of men and women were active in the streets surrounding Tahrir 
Square, the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution in Cairo. They were active in organizing, 
advocacy, micro-management, poster making, providing food, cleaning streets, 
commemorating the martyrs, and eventually becoming involved with the growing 
political movements that in some cases were born in Tahrir. The best way to describe 
them is as “activists”, they work according to the heartbeat of ‘the street’ they were not 
originally politically affiliated though several have taken on inclusive, popular agendas 
and believe all members of society deserve their rights. Some of them have crossed paths 
with large youth movements such as, April 6th movement, Kefaya, Revolutionary Youth, 
and many more. Some have taken beatings or seen their comrades beaten at the hands of 
security forces, others have witnessed attacks on them by rivaling political forces, some 
spent time in jail and others spend their time organizing amongst their peers. Beginning 
within six or seven years prior to the revolution up until the post-revolution era, their 
work has been never-ending and is no less important. The time is now for this group of 
people who are often the closest to reality when it comes to understanding and living 
within an eroded political, social, and economic sphere. They themselves and their 
friends, family, etc. are victims, they are the closest to understanding the importance of 
the revolution, the need to continue challenging government, and that they are not the 
same civil society as the ones they have heard of- the ones that receive millions of dollars 
in funding, support from foreign governments, and have high-rise corporate offices 
arranging development initiatives. They are trying to develop the people around them, 
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with constant discussion, protest marches, and face-to-face lobbying amongst their 
detractors. 
One man I spoke with I met on the one-year anniversary of the revolution in 
Tahrir square. His name is Mo and at first glance he appeared to be a leader, standing at 
the front of a large tent that him and his ‘colleagues’ assembled, with the names and 
photos of the martyrs, those who had passed, during the revolution. He was micro-
managing a garbage clean up (which I took part in), occasionally dabbling in poster 
making, and speaking with interested bystanders who had questions about their motives 
or agenda as a tented resident of the square. His responses always reflected the need to 
care for the “new Egypt”; it’s people and governing with social justice as a top priority. It 
was great to have met with him again, this time at a café in a narrow street behind the 
square, to have some tea during the interview. Not sure of his experience with the term 
civil society, still I went ahead and asked for his opinions. Mo explained: 
 
“Civil society is the heartbeat of the street. Not just the street, any organization or 
institution, or the nation, it’s also how we connect thought, and different beliefs of 
the society. Civil society should be close to all levels of society; all levels of 
society should find an equal balance within civil society.” 
 
“Yes. I do consider myself as part of civil society. We need civil society to fix our 
court, our ministry of justice, because everything seems to still be unjust. We are 
never going to forget the Mubarak regime, because they destroyed civil society. 
We need to learn from Mubarak’s regime because they were very cruel to us and 
cruel to civil society and they destroyed it. Civil society vanished during the end 
of the Mubarak regime. They also refused any suggestions civil society might 
have had.” 
 
Interestingly enough he does not seem to reference the NGO sector as a primary leader of 
civil society while asserting that the sector is “the heartbeat of the street.” Additionally, 
he makes a statement that no one else had mentioned before during my research, that civil 
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society should be a part of all levels of society. This is a profound statement for two 
reasons: firstly, that civil society, the one we most often come to hear about, is not 
connected to all levels of society as Mo makes the point that it should be. Secondly, he 
references “levels” of society, rather than considering the sector to be an all 
encompassing space lying between the “state and the family.” An emphasis should be 
made on these levels of the state, in a reference to James Ferguson; much of African civil 
society is not on the grassroots or bottom level, as many believe, leaving it to be 
dominated by transnational organizations, and government. While NGOs and formal 
CSOs are explicit in their active involvement with urban and rural poor communities, it is 
clear that Montasser does not see the same civil society I have become accustomed with 
and is valued by much of academic community, as well as foreign and local governments. 
Next I was fortunate enough to meet an incredibly active young woman, Maha, at 
the headquarters of a small liberal political party called the Revolutionary Ghad.  It was 
relatively quiet with only a few men acting as security while they sipped tea and 
conversed. With a great smile and a charming personality, her political will appears 
unbroken and more willing than ever to swallow challenges that surely will lay ahead of 
them, no thanks to the government. As a leading activist, she bravely campaigns for 
expanding women’s rights in a time where there is a conservative counterattack in favor 
of patriarchal principles. Stones and other hard, oddly shaped materials have been thrown 
towards their marches, as a thin row of men take the blows by surrounding decently sized 
crowds of fed up women who chant in unison for their equal individual rights. And yet 
they continue to organize rallies and courageously march throughout downtown Cairo. 
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This is what she said when I asked her what she believed to be civil society and whether 
she was a part of that: 
 
“Civil society needs to serve the people, all kinds of people, in jail or outside jail, 
unemployed or employed, educated or uneducated. I try to work with civil society, 
as much as I can, helping, calling, receiving calls, doing what I consider are my 
duties. Anyone who is willing to give up his effort is part of civil society, and I am 
willing, I try to work in the streets as much as I can. I met a lot of people that 
went to jail, got tortured, I’ve tried to help them as much as I can with whatever is 
in my reach. I am part of civil society in a direct and indirect way. What I try to 
do is transport the voice of the people from the streets to wherever the media, or 
wherever it needs to go.” 
 
With her eyes filling with tears, you could feel her passion and love for the people she 
serves was interminable. She speaks of an energetic civil society where one volunteers 
their time to either help the less fortunate or as she said, “making calls, receiving calls” 
and to help in any way possible when it comes to the plights of the street. She also 
explains that she has a role to transport the voice of the street to those who are listening, 
this does not sound like one civil society where democracy thrives and all voices are 
heard. It sounds as if the voice of the people is almost separate from the formally 
functioning, more recognizable, supposed civil society- which is actually supposed to be 
the location for the opinions, voices, and debates of the so called heartbeat of the street. 
All and All you wonder to yourself where are CSOs in all of this, where is their work in 
empowering those in the street or the majority of people when the people themselves are 
seemingly doing what they can on their own and with limited resources? 
Next, I met with a young woman named Sally who I met through my interview 
with Relief International. Sally is what you may call a woman of many trades, a student, 
dentist, activist, and a leader of several informal organizations known as ‘initiatives.’ 
Together with many individuals and groups she met in her hometown of Alexandria 
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during the revolution, she co-founded what were once small gatherings of volunteers that 
have since become a few thousand strong youth force to reckon with. These initiatives 
were put together with the intention of doing “good” for the Egyptian people, especially 
for civic engagement, without the legal red tape that is obligatory when an organization 
or NGO is started. Instead these young adults bypass the legal process and only have to 
find locations, such as auditoriums, which may hold these large groups of volunteers. 
Here the magic happens. They create ideas, focus groups, hold workshops and motivate 
their members to become leaders for the issues they individually care about. Whatever 
work they do, it’s done in a creative and innovative manner, the need little funding and 
are able to sustain their work by members volunteering a few hours a week of their time 
to do their part. Sally said something to me during the interview that will always stick 
with me, “it should never be difficult to make positive change in your community.” She 
said this with a hint of frustration quickly masked by her upbeat and positive personality. 
I went ahead and asked her the important question, what did she think was Egyptian civil 
society? 
 
“It is more or less an organization that stimulates social change, but not military, 
not governmental. This a huge difference, the difference between charity and 
development, because the majority who do charity say they are doing 
development, but no, doing charity or relief is not really development, it is 
immediate relief not long term relief.” 
 
Sally makes the quick distinction between charity work, which dominates much of the 
local NGO scene in Egypt, and development organizations that have long-term goals for 
society. Her explicit discounting of charity organizations as civil society, it seems, was a 
direct attack on the hundreds of NGOs that consider them to be civil society, are also able 
to receive international funding, and that work without a sustainable model for society. 
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Charity is a short-term solution that does not bring to light the root of the primary 
problems associated with providing humanitarian relief to the needy. While it can be 
affective and millions in Egypt are in need of some kind of relief, the problems will 
continue to grow for the next generation if organizations do little to confront the root 
causes. Next, I asked her to describe what she is involved in and how it is connected or a 
part of Egyptian civil society: 
 
“It works like any formal group, usually they start because of a charismatic 
person who leads or motivates people to join him or her, usually students or 
recently graduated to didn’t find work yet, and they don’t want to be committed 
full time to development work but at the same time they want to do something. The 
best solution is the initiative thing. The first initiative in Egypt was Adwar, in 
2005, in Alexandria, it was the first one who announced themselves with a 
professional foundation, but without being a foundation. They have a really cool 
story: “you and I want to do something, but society doesn’t give us a chance, 
because of this, we everyone has to play a role, you get a role, I get a role, we all 
take a role.” 
 
“Everyone plays their role. I think these are the civil society organizations, not 
necessarily the really established NGOs. Because for example, Adwar, the first 
initiative, produced the most now political activists that represent Alexandria and 
they work now in Cairo. So these initiatives maybe they are not really visible, but 
they develop a lot the capacity of their members. So, you really help their 
awareness, and building capacity, which I think is the aim of the other NGOs, but 
the other NGOs really work for their name. But these other people work for both 
individually and the name of the initiative.” 
 
“We also do programs with juniors, from like 11 to 16. Because everyone are 
trying to develop the youth, but people already have their personalities formed 
already, but if you target a younger audience this can be better for the country. 
We try and show them how the real world goes but in a really simple way.  I think 
Egyptian civil society is one of the strongest civil societies ever.” 
 
“Another very good initiative is Open Space initiative. They promote using space 
in a creative way, for contemporary art, for political messages, street art, graffiti, 
street dance, flash mob etc. What’s great about initiatives is that they utilize ‘new’ 
and ‘creative’ techniques. Initiatives are definitely civil society. 
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Sally had zero doubt in her face when she said that Egyptian civil society is “one of the 
strongest civil societies ever” and that that initiatives are central to the sector. The work 
that they conduct constantly involves reaching out to the population and either building 
awareness or the capacity of their members. They all are considered leaders and they 
volunteer their time selflessly in order to make a positive contribution to their informal 
organization. The function and work conducted by these initiatives appear to be the 
grassroots actor that most academics cite as civil society, though without the credit, 
funding, or accolades. The members value education, being aware, increasing citizen 
activity, and the health of their home, Egypt. Yet they continue to work under the radar, 
out of sight from national government, and with minimal contact with transnational 
NGOs, because of their supposed “illegitimacy”. 
Finally, I was able to reach another activist, a friend, and someone, who similar 
many others in this section, committed their lives to work for the good of society and the 
country. His background in human rights, non-violent action, and organizing led him to 
the forefront of the Kefaya and April 6th movement as well as playing an active and 
influential role in the uprising against the government. Because he was out of the country 
at the time of the interview, we proceeded to meet on the video chat “Skype” to discuss 
his opinions on civil society. However instead I asked him about whether he believed 
international NGOs are Egyptian civil society and whether they should continue to have 
an active supporting role. He responded by saying: 
 
“We have to be very realistic, how could Egyptian civil society survive without 
donations, without donors, without funding. Most of them, at least the ones who 
do a good job, have no local source of funding. So the only way to receive any 
funding, or to get any training, or whatever, is to look outside, abroad, foreign 
organizations, international organizations and whether they are governmental 
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and non-governmental, and whether they are civil. So in this case, it is a little bit 
complicated and we have to widen our perspective a little bit. This is a necessity, 
it is a symbiotic relationship, and without it they would die. But do you consider 
them to be a part of Egyptian civil society? If they are working to serve Egyptian 
people, in Egypt, then they are part of that civil society. If we look at an 
organization like, I don’t know, Freedom House, it is funded by the U.S. But is it a 
governmental organization is it part of a ministry? No, it is not official. It is a 
civilian organization that deals with civil society in Egypt, so it is within the 
category.” 
 
Here Ahmed lays out his justifications for international NGO work because of the fear 
that local, smaller organizations would lose funding, lack the necessary technical support, 
will ultimately lose their sustainability. While he brings up an important point, it seems to 
me that formal local organizations are at the helm of their international counterparts and 
essentially have to work towards the results, needs and agenda of the donor. Moreover, 
the point he makes clearly implies that many CSOs in Egypt are just barely getting by 
and will do what is necessary to receive funding in order to sustain their work and 
livelihoods. It is clear that the support given by transnational organizations is clearly 
appreciated and needed, however at what costs will civil society have to endure this 
relationship when the bottom line is that the primary reason civil society suffers is 
because of government, which just so happens to be a central counterpart of transnational 
organizations. 
Here in this section we have highlighted the opinions and voices of distinct social 
forces of both civil society and the state. My research has led me to interviews with 
members from the local and international NGO community, foreign governments or 
affiliate organizations, activists, community youth organizers, the Mosque, Orthodox 
Church, and the Muslim Brotherhood to improve my understanding of what civil society 
organizations and individuals deem to be “Egyptian civil society”. Using the voices of a 
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wide range of opinions has brought the opportunity to balance, compare, and juxtapose 
the relatively different variations of what civil society is in Egypt. The next section, using 
the same outlining process, I will present the same interviews in order to discuss and 
analyze opinions on government interaction and how their actions affect civil society. 
 
 
Civil Society and Government: How close is too close? 
 
a. Level of Interaction with Government 
i. International NGO’s 
 
This section analyzes to what extent there are government restrictions and on the 
type of relationship social forces of civil society have with political society. This section 
will also reveal whether organizations cannot accomplish work without government, 
cannot sustain without government, or are carrying out the work of government on the 
same hierarchical level of the state. 
Lets begin again with the interview with CARE International’s country director. 
About half way through I took some time to ask about and discuss CARE’s interactions 
with government. First I asked him how his organization interacts with government. 
 
“Well Local NGOs of course are different than international NGOs. We are much 
less highly regulated, much less highly controlled, so there is a real role for 
international NGOs here in Egypt to support local NGOs, and to be able to do 
things and say things on behalf of local NGOs that local NGOs wouldn’t dare to 
sometimes say. And like I said, all local NGOs are given money by the ministry of 
social development… they all need to have any money that they receive from us, 
they need to have it approved in writing, even donations need to have approval, 
so they are quite tightly regulated, where is with us, we basically report to the 
ministry of social development which has an NGO branch to it. We are generally, 
fairly lightly regulated and we are supposed to give reports on a regular basis of 
what we are doing, but they don’t have to be advanced reports. They can be like 
here in the last 6 months and show funding and how we are using it. The way the 
government can control us is by controlling the local partners. They don’t care so 
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much about what we’re doing they care a lot more about what local partners are 
doing.” 
 
On whether the interaction between CARE and government positively or negatively 
affects the services the organization provides: 
 
“Yeah, government support is critical for us. That’s kind of the third leg, local 
partners but also government. And we have a lot of success from local 
government. The real hard part is national government, in Egypt as in most cases, 
local government is much more responsive, much more understanding of needs on 
the ground, they’re sometimes themselves impacted or their families are impacted 
by a lack of services. They are closer to the local community and feel more 
accountable to the community, so we have a lot of really strong local government 
ties, local ministry people, local governorate people, and that’s where we put a 
lot of our efforts in, explaining what we are doing, presentations, getting their buy 
in… you know at the end of a project you want the government to have picked up 
the ideas, objectives, and you can’t do that unless they share the ideas and 
objectives in the first place… so, government is definitely critical, but the tough 
one is national government.” 
 
In his response to the question around government interaction, he explains the difference 
between local and international state control and capabilities. It seems that government is 
more fearful of local NGOs, likely because their interests as an organization are different. 
Local NGOs, other than charities, who are the most capable of reaching a broader 
audience, have a difficult time organizing workshops on civic engagement, the 
constitution, governance, corruption, basically areas that are deemed a threat to the state’s 
power. International NGOs on the other hand have an easier time implementing their 
work yet they certainly have trouble reaching the broader target audience, as they simply 
do not have an interest in challenging the local government with a politicized message. I 
wonder if these international organizations, that have working relationships with 
government, have thought of challenging the state’s restrictions on local organizations? 
Would this empower local organizations and put international organizations out of work 
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if the local were able to function without persecution and suppression? Compelling 
thought. Furthermore, international NGOs seem to be put up on a pedestal, indicating that 
the state may have less power over transnational organizations as they often perform 
similar work that the state is responsible for. The following question was whether 
CARE’s relationship with the government positively or negatively affects your 
relationship with other local NGOs. His response reflects a recurring theme of confusion 
as to what it is civil society can do in Egypt: 
 
“Yeah, well Egypt has become a bit complicated of course. Under Mubarak, life 
was a lot simpler in many ways. I mean you knew the people who had been there 
for a long time, the policies were in place, everything was clear on what you 
could do what you couldn’t do, both for us and local NGOs. Now, it is much more 
unclear, there is a new NGO law that has been going through parliament and 
now there is no parliament anymore… So what are the policies in terms of civil 
society? Nobody knows, what are the policies in terms of cooperating with foreign 
funded entities and all this business? Nobody knows, so it has become a lot more 
difficult.” 
 
Here it is clear that under Mubarak, there was indeed a status quo, an awareness of where 
one stood within the state as a civil society, and which boundaries could not be crossed. 
Also, this NGO worker is correct in his statement, it would have been a simpler system 
for the NGO sector, especially for INGOs, to not challenge the status-quo, to accept 
discriminatory policies, and to ultimately do some socio-economic ‘good’ while 
sustaining the organization’s survival in an important international branch.  There is a 
direct correlation to the transnational nature of this organization and the bilateral 
agreements made between government and supposed civil society leaders. CARE, as well 
as several INGOs, functions under an agreement with the government saying that they 
will work under a specific mandate with obvious restrictions. Ministries of the 
government regulate all funding to the NGO sector and CSOs, which requires all 
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exchanges of funds to be reported. If the government dislikes the use of funding, an 
organization’s work will be halted and could cease to exist, particularly in the case of a 
local registered organization. 
 
“Local partners see us as a bit of an umbrella to protect them. If they are getting 
funding from us, we’ll often help them. If the ministry sees that ‘youth for 
development and environment’ in Minya, a local NGO, is getting money from 
CARE, and if they know CARE, which they do, they are more likely to say okay 
this looks fine, we’ll sign off on it. If the NGO is getting money from Qatar, or 
some entity the ministry doesn’t really know, there is going to be a lot more 
question, about where is the money coming from, why does it come here, what are 
you going to do with it, all this kind of stuff… so to some extent we have a 
symbiotic relationship with our local partners that we need them for local 
knowledge, local implementation, local constituency, and they need us for 
legitimacy, for training, capacity building, and they need us for lobbying and 
advocacy for the government. They other reason is their reach doesn’t often 
extend nationally, there are very few NGOs in Egypt that work on the local level 
as well as the national level, and that is a big weakness here. And that is one of 
our niches we see with CARE, because we have 4 field offices, we have field staff, 
and so although the local partners do the work, still our field staff interacts a lot 
with local communities, partners, and so we get a lot of information about what is 
happening, what people want, what people need. For example in the water sector, 
if you read the statistics, officially it says 96 percent of Egyptians have access to 
household to water. Where is I can give you examples of many villages in Beni 
Suef, just 2 hours south of Cairo, where 40 percent of the households don’t have a 
water tap. So you wouldn’t know that unless you actually worked in Beni Suef, 
talked to local government, and then dug deeper and talked to local civil society, 
then actually went into households and things like that. It takes a lot of work to do 
that, so that is a big weakness in Egypt. You either have advocacy groups, at the 
national level, or you have these local implementers and there is not a strong link 
between the two.” 
 
What must be said, in regards to the point that local partners use the influence of 
transnational organizations to protect and work as an “umbrella”, is that, although having 
protection from government is certainly a positive result of INGO influence, it also 
means that the government’s influence within civil society grows through these 
relationships. INGOs certainly want to work with local organizations that are “compliant” 
and “legitimate” in the eyes of the government, especially in order to maintain their 
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working relationship with political society. Firstly, a “legitimate” local organization 
suggests that it is “registered” with the government and is authorized to work as a non-
governmental organization. Secondly, to be registered requires an organization’s funding 
to come from either a government ministry, which is limited and allows government to 
control the funds and ultimately the work of NGOs, a local source which is limited, or an 
international source which is in many ways unlimited but highly regulated.  The 
government is then aware of funding, who it is coming from and how it is being used, 
which allows for political society to maneuver against civil society and maintain the state 
dynamics of power- or status quo.  Is this a positive result for local organizations? No, 
because their work as a civil society becomes more regulated, obviously less political, 
highly controlled by donors, and will maintain similar dynamics and hierarchical levels 
of power within the state. I believe the NGO sector will claim that they do what they can 
with the space provided, which is not a whole lot. 
With my interview with Plan Egypt, the country director was less than 
enthusiastic when discussing their interaction with government as an INGO. I asked him 
firstly how his organization interacts with government, his response being: 
 
“Well we have the ministry of social solidarity that supervises all NGOs, except 
for CARE; they have a special presidential decree. Anyway, we have to be 
supervised by the ministry of social solidarity, and the minister was confirmed to 
continue since the revolution, but the point is we used to have monthly meeting 
with the undersecretary of the minister of social solidarity, and I had my monthly 
meeting with the ministry as well. It’s actually okay, especially at the local level; 
there is a very good relationship that the Egyptian staff knows very well how to 
have a positive relationship with them. But then you have this security system, 
which are not actually the security people, but within social solidarity there are 
security guys who are in all the meetings, and approves or disapproves things. 
They have this idea that there is a potential of something political. On a personal 
side, what happens to any of us that go out, I can’t leave the city without being 
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‘followed’. Normally on field trips when our staff goes, well there is some strange 
guy and he’s the security guy.” 
 
“Approval. There is a registration, and they have to have an approved board. 
Most CDAs have to have government functionaries on the board. And everything 
is yearly audited, and ours do because we are heavily supervised.” 
 
Not surprisingly, his answer reflects the over-regulation and control that is discussed 
thoroughly by fellow CSOs.  I asked him if his relationship with the government assists 
or makes the delivery of their services more difficult: 
 
“Of course. But, it is a real unique sort of situation. The messiest democracy I 
worked in was Bangladesh, another big country, hugely populated, Muslim, 
where the government is really ineffective. So we could do a lot of stuff, but not 
very effectively with government institutions, it’s even hard to meet people in 
higher levels of government. So everything we do is pure civil society, tons of 
NGOs, the Mecca of NGOs. Here there are very few NGOs, international, 
compared to other countries because of all these restrictions. Actually I have seen 
opportunities, where there is a certain amount of stability in a dictatorship 
bureaucracy; there is not as much change and more stability. And we found 
opportunities to even talk to ministers, we just signed an agreement with the 
minister of youth, and the Muslim Brotherhood is going to take over that one. The 
dictatorship over all these years created this control system that is top-down 
controlled, so the bottom, even though it’s stable, it is totally unaccountable.” 
 
Here the interviewee makes two important points. First, he reflects a need for stability for 
civil society, yet recognizes that the stability provided by a dictatorship is no agent for 
change, inevitably resulting in the ineffective development of society as a whole. Second, 
he describes the “top-down” system of control seen under Mubarak where the “bottom” 
is unaccounted. In this case then, where do INGOs stand in this vertical, “top-down” 
system if they carry out functions of government and arrange ministerial meetings while 
also representing a constituency that is at the “bottom” of this system? This question will 
be elaborated and discussed later. 
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The interview with Relief International inevitably led to my curiosity of what 
their interactions with government are like. Three of the four responded with a spirited 
debate on the extent of government registration for both local and international NGOs. 
 
“R1: First of all, there are contacts between civil society and government- this is 
a must. For example, in order to start, you must have contact with the 
government. 
 
R3: I guess you can register with different ministries; you can register with 
ministry of foreign affairs, also with the ministry of social affairs. Different 
International organizations register with different ministries. 
 
R2: It is a requirement, for an international NGO, to register with both. We apply 
with the ministry of foreign affairs and then second we apply ministry of social 
affairs. 
 
R3: It depends because I know some foundations applied with just one ministry so 
I think it has to do with status. 
 
R2: CARE for example, and a few others are with the ministry of international 
cooperation, since the 50’s, but all other organizations, registered INGOs, are 
registered through both ministries. We are waiting to be approved as an INGO, 
we are legally not working because we are not registered yet. 
 
R3: Because we have submitted the papers, and they know of our submission, RI 
is working through formal compartments to implement a project- but we are 
technically not supposed to be working ourselves” 
 
This debate not only reveals the complicated process and red tape necessary to cross in 
order to become a functioning and legitimate NGO in Egypt, but also that NGOs are 
meant to have a working relationship with their respective ministries- making any kind of 
political development a difficult and nearly impossible feat. 
 
ii. Local NGO’s 
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Next this section will present and discuss the responses of a couple local NGOs in 
regards to their interactions with government. Masr Al Kheir responds to my question by 
saying: 
 
“There is a required reporting with the Ministry of Social Affairs, their policies 
govern us. For example if we need to do relations or cooperation with an 
international agency, we need to have the approval with the ministry of social 
affairs.” What makes it easy or difficult to receive approval? 
 
“Well we have two phases, one before the revolution and one after the revolution. 
After, I guess it is not settled yet, we don’t know how easy it is or how hard it is to 
get approval, but before it was quite hard. You had to do a lot of work and it takes 
time. You have to get the approval from the security as well. Dealing with the 
government you cannot expect anything. There are no specific, clear rules.” 
 
I then asked if their relationship with the government makes it difficult or assists them in 
providing services. One of the two responded by saying: 
 
“The government makes it easy to provide services. If we want to work in Upper 
Egypt or in a village, you need the support of the governor or the mayor and the 
local people. So we meet them and we establish good relations with them and so 
they help us provide services and projects- they welcome us.” 
 
Here the interviewees acknowledge the difficult and confusing relationship with 
government yet believe that they are necessary to collaborate with. They see this as 
necessary relationship because if they did not have the support of local or national 
government, then their projects would be undermined and ultimately fail. So what we are 
seeing is that government has become such an influential partner that CSOs want to 
receive support and praise from them- further developing a relationship of inferiority. It 
seems that successful development is not possible without government assistance or 
cooperation. Civil society members then become arms of the government and therefore 
become incapable of performing their functions as a CSO. In certain cases it seems 
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appropriate to withdraw supposed CSOs from civil society, as these organizations are not 
what they appear. 
For the next local NGO, Education for Employment in Egypt, the government 
interaction is much of the same as is Masr Al Kheir. They deal with government only 
through the approval process, for instance for program funding. Farah responded to two 
of my questions surrounding government interaction by saying: 
 
“We are a local organization and we are a part of a affiliate network, so there 
are EFE’s all over the region, and we have a sister organization in Europe. But 
what’s great about the organization is that each affiliates functions completely 
independently in accordance with the local governance. So our interaction is that 
we are registered with the Ministry of social solidarity, all NGOs have to be, all 
our funds have to be approved by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, but besides 
that, we don’t really work directly with governance- its more for approvals more 
than anything.” 
 
And when I asked her if the government in any way affect the services they 
provide, she responded with,  “No. Not at all, the biggest thing is approval. But 
besides that, there is very little interaction.  Because of the split within the 
ministry of social solidarity there is a lot of confusion because a lot of people 
don’t really know which ministry is handling what.” 
 
As an organization that specializes in education, the interaction with government is 
minimal and becomes less of a problem, as they are not a political threat. Most NGOs do 
not involve themselves in the political realm, out of fear or disinterest, and are made up 
of humanitarian organizations that provide charity, education and health services. Though 
they still must seek approval from government, NGO work is strongly encouraged to be 
apolitical and exist within the regulatory system, for the sake of national security. 
 
iii. Foreign Government 
 
Here the interaction between the national Egyptian government with a foreign 
government counterpart will be presented and discussed. In the case of USAID, who is 
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celebrating their fiftieth anniversary in Egypt, my interview with a staff member of the 
controversial Democracy and Governance sector will discuss their relationship with the 
national government. Firstly I asked him to discuss the interaction between USAID and 
Egyptian government: 
 
“The vast majority of our money is actually in bilateral agreements that we would 
have with the ministry of justice to implement an automation system to improve 
the way the court systems function. Or with the ministry of local development we 
work on ways that we can put into effect a de-centralization law and roll that out, 
or with the ministry of health… you know, these kinds of things with different 
ministries. And we sign agreements with them, and some of them actually have a 
component where there’s going to be funding for local CSO’s out of that, like 
some complementary piece. So we call that our bilateral programs, and then we 
have unilateral programs that we’ve chosen to do on our own. So, this is where 
the controversy lays, but with all these bilateral programs we’re working 
extremely closely, I mean our staff on a daily or weekly basis are working hand in 
hand with government counterparts, and our implementing partners need to do 
the same.” 
 
There are several interesting points to take from this response. Firstly, the majority of 
funds are distributed to bilateral agreements between various ministries of government. 
USAID works side by side, and therefore work on the same governmental level as the 
Egyptian government. They then involve CSOs, that they have approved, that can 
implement their projects. This makes it appear, to USAID, as if their funds are being 
transferred to “real” civil society organizations that are implementing government 
planned development project. Secondly, the rest of their funding goes towards unilateral 
agreements. Unilateral agreements imply the solo nature of this portion of their funding 
as they develop their own projects without government interference, meant for the 
Egyptian people, as if they were actually government themselves. USAID, in this 
instance, work “above” the state, and are carrying out functions of the state. The next 
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question I asked the USAID staff member to discuss was the approval process with 
government in order to carry out their funded projects: 
 
“Well, umm, this is the controversial issue. The government of Egypt, well some 
people in the former regime were saying that we needed to actually receive their 
approval before doing anything. And our contention, especially after the 
revolution, was that we wanted to work directly with the people of Egypt. And we 
informed the government about the projects that we had this idea to do, the vast 
majority of our money is with bilateral programs and this was actually a 
relatively small portion of this overall gigantic assistance that we provide to the 
government of Egypt. But they weren’t comfortable with that foresight. We 
actually have laws that prevent us from having the host government veto our 
projects. So we have some legal restrictions on our end too, but of course any law 
84 registered NGO has to of course, well first of all they have to have been 
registered, and secondly they need project approval from the ministry of social 
affairs. 
Aboul Naga, the Minister of International Cooperation, was in charge of 
our bilateral agreements, and so her contention was that we went outside this 
scope, of the bilateral agreements. So there have been exchanges back and forth 
but it has been controversial since 2005 but then we assumed that there had been 
a revolution and that some of the old rules wouldn’t apply, but I mean as we saw 
in this transition period, there is a lot of remnants. But I’m fairly optimistic with 
this new government at least up until a couple days ago (Protests at the US 
embassies in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, etc.), that there was going to be a lot more 
interest in collaborating with the United States government, as it had been under 
the interim regime. With IMF and these types of things, they are approaching us 
with concrete ideas and ways they want us to help their government to improve.” 
 
The controversy he is referring was during and following the revolution, USAID was 
providing international and local NGOs with funding without the consent of the Egyptian 
government, although USAID felt it was within their guidelines of the unilateral 
agreements. In this case, it was the Egyptian government that felt threatened by the work 
of USAID and the fact that they had undermined the nation’s sovereignty. The 
controversy reveals both a differing agenda and the disappearing lines between the 
Egyptian government and it’s foreign government allies. The interviewee was heavily 
aware of the controversy, seemed to understand why it was controversial, and yet, they 
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will continue to collaborate and work side by side with the Egyptian government for the 
sake of their interests in the region. Moreover, his response made a few points clear in 
regards to the USAID relationship with Egypt, 1.the U.S. has laws that prevent and 
restrict the host government from vetoing an agreed project 2. USAID will only work 
with registered NGOs and these NGOs still are required to have project approval from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, and 3. The newly elected government appears to have a higher 
interest, than the previous regime, in working and collaborating with the U.S. 
government. These three points are not only controversial but ensures their support that 
the status quo from political society and civil society will continue as is. USAID has 
leverage over the Egyptian government and are then working above the state level, they 
will continue to associate and collaborate with NGOs that have little to zero political 
involvement, and because their relationship with the Egyptian government is improving- 
it appears they will continue to work as they have over the previous decades. The final 
question asked, out of curiosity, is whether the interactions with Egyptian government 
allow USAID’s work to be more or less difficult. 
 
“I think it’s mixed, I think that in some ways working directly with civil society 
organizations is a faster way to deliver services, but, it can be less sustainable. 
Ideally, you want to be working with government counterparts whenever possible. 
Well actually ideally what you would be doing is you would be funding a bilateral 
program, and then you would have complimentary unilateral programs, that is if 
you want to work on anti-corruption, you want to collaborate with a state audit 
agency, you want to collaborate with the prosecutor general’s office, if you want 
to collaborate with the ministry of justice, you know there are a whole bunch of 
government organs that are dealing with the officials state-side of this. But then 
you also want to be working for the demand side, you’d want to be working with 
grass-roots organizations that are putting pressure upwards on transparency, on 
asking for budgets to be made clear to everyone, so you want these programs and 
them to be putting pressure on members of parliament to advocate for changes. 
So ideally, from the perspective of a donor, you actually want to be working with 
both levels, and what you’d really want is the government officials to buy in to the 
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fact that if they get on the local level, advocacy for change, that this could 
actually help them. And this is a much easier sell in principle; it’s a much easier 
sell with the new government. Because with the new government you say look you 
want to implement new policies, these are organizations that can help to do that. I 
was at a session the day before yesterday with the member of the high election 
commission and he was saying we have to collaborate with CSO’s because they 
can do a much more effective job of civic education, voter education, they’re in 
these communities, they can get up and help register people, I mean it is 
remarkable to have a government official say that. I think it depends on the 
individual and it depends on the ministry or whatever. But I think there is 
recognition that, like in any place around the world, that there is a role to be 
played by CSOs.” 
 
Here, the result is evident- that working with government is the preferred venue for 
USAID and is obviously beneficial for the host government, hardly surprising. He 
believes civil society organizations to have a less sustainable affect, however is this not 
due to government regulation? Furthermore, in reference to a previous discussion that 
civil society is supported and championed through policy, it is clear that they want to 
“support civil society”, they want to work with grassroots organizations and that they 
allocate funds for this purpose. However, it has become clear that there is more interest in 
supporting a civil society that does not carry out the functions of civil society- for 
instance putting pressure on government over various domestic issues- than supporting 
organizations that will challenge the dynamics of power within the state. They do not 
actually put pressure on the authoritarian government to respect rights, tackle corruption, 
and decrease political society dominance in order to grow and expand space for civil 
society actors to function in a manner that will develop society as a whole. This is made 
evident on their website for USAID Egypt as they explain on their history page that they 
are proudly involved in the development of the economy, health, and education services, 
rather than developing governance and challenging human rights abuses by the state. 
 114
Next, I asked one of the development contractors to discuss their affiliation with the 
Egyptian government, if any at all. The interviewee, Pete, responded saying: 
 
“Most of the USAID projects I have worked on have all been working with 
government counterparts, other ministries. And US Wheat deals with for the most 
part, the government and private millers and bakers. But as far as their direction 
on what they can and cannot do, they advise the government on regulations and 
they speak to the government for the most part for whom they can talk to and how 
they can go about things. Almost every project I have worked on has done their 
work through the government, or a government counterpart. Because you have 
defined goals, you have agreed to a contract with defined goals with USAID, and 
USAID has agreed with the Egyptian government what’s going to happen. So you 
have to deal with the government no matter what they say, they can say no we no 
longer want this or we are going to shift gears and change directions. You have to 
deal with the government in order to get anything done. Politics and economics 
are both an ends to each other… I think.” 
 
Pete explains the deep relationship between government and USAID and how almost all 
of the projects he has been involved with are worked out with government. There is a 
deep relationship between development and government in Egypt although USAID 
continues to fund what they believe to be civil society. The bottom line is that 
development contractors for USAID and any government entity such as USAID work on 
a state level, in some cases even above the state, and at the same time promote civil 
society which hopes to scale back government. He then proceeded to respond to several 
of my questions regarding development in Egypt and the agendas of various external 
forces (the West, the Islamic bloc, and transnational organizations): 
 
“Well let me put it this way: there are western goals and there are more Islamic 
goals. That’s the divide right there. Within the western goals they can pretend or 
think that they are all doing something different, but that’s not the way its viewed 
by the Ikhwan or the Islamic side. Pumping money in for tourism, or for whatever 
it may be, is viewed as something political and they are going to try and own 
whatever happens here. But for example, a company like CARE and a company 
like Cimonex would argue that they are doing two very different things. CARE 
would say they are doing it for the people, we’re a non-profit, we work in grass 
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roots. Cimonex would say well we are doing that too, but we do it for profit so we 
also take projects that do such and such but we do it in a little bit of a different 
way. But at the end, it’s all Western influence here, the more money that the west 
can pump in will have an influence on the way the politics goes, and how society 
evolves here. And the more money that the Saudi’s and Qatari’s can pump in may 
support a counter measure to that. Is USAID money politically charged? Yes. I 
think each individual project is yes, it is meant to make Egypt more western. And 
it’s meant to integrate Egypt into the global system, as we define it. But at the end 
of the day in Egypt, the Suez Canal, the fact that it has a border and a large army 
on that border, with Israel, are all more important than the actual development 
issue at hand. In general USAID is meant to stabilize Egypt, and bring it in to the 
Western world, so that Egypt doesn’t attack Israel, doesn’t close the Suez Canal, 
and keeps things favorable for the West. That’s my belief. USAID, World Bank, 
EU, UN, these are all donors, and they all have different charters and different 
agendas, which we are seeing right now, because they’re all trying to bring 
money to Egypt to stabilize it. They are trying to make sure Egypt does not go into 
a direction that will not deal with the West, or do something that the West doesn’t 
like.” 
 
He then made several interesting points in an attempt to differentiate between 
development workers and their backgrounds: 
 
“Also you have to distinguish between Aid workers. There are people who truly 
believe in development and there are others who at some point in their career, 
decide that they could make more money, would like to see the world, by doing 
development work. For instance I worked in privatization projects and all those 
people, they were all ex-wall street millionaires that decided they wanted an 
easier life and they’d work for a couple years here and work for a couple years 
there, and they had a lot of advice to give on developing a capitalist market, 
developing the stock market, bond market, and all of that. They had advice to 
give, but they weren’t doing it out of some love, maybe they were doing it out of 
pride where they helped develop the Egyptian stock market, but they weren’t 
doing it out of some love or betterment of the Egyptian people. Forgive me for 
saying this but it’s the same thing with USAID employees, when USAID says you 
are moving to another country, I don’t think they care what happens to the 
Egyptian people, but at the end of the day, Americans look at it like it’s their 
career, it’s their job, and they’re trying to do better for their family, and if they do 
good elsewhere, that’s alright too.” 
 
Here, Pete provides a detailed description of the types of people that work on these 
USAID, WB, IMF projects, and distinguishes between those who know about the region 
and those who don’t. Also, there are those that do development work in Egypt without 
 116
necessarily involving themselves within society as they provide prescriptions to 
government as an expert or consultant would. 
 
iv. Activists and Initiatives 
 
Finally, I present the research findings and opinions on the government 
interactions between various activists of “the street”. Interestingly enough, this is a 
limited discussion. The interviews discussed previously in this section involve civil 
society actors, or influential actors within the state that affect civil society, that either 
work closely with government or find themselves heavily restricted by them. Also, these 
interviews were with “formal” actors of society, meaning they are registered and 
monitored in some capacity by the government. For the following interviews, these 
members of ‘the street’ are just civilians and do not belong to formal entities, in fact their 
work is focused around what happens in the street as they play multiple roles for the sake 
of their communities. 
For these activists interactions with political society are limited though 
significant. Their work is considered controversial because they advocate for issues that 
are political in nature and that publically critiques the work of government. They have 
shared experiences with government security forces having all witnessed and experienced 
brutality, have been arrested or detained, though these experiences were not discussed in 
depth.  All three, similar to millions of Egyptians, have avoided working in a formal 
manner due to their disagreements with government and, beginning with the revolution, 
have increased their public involvement in the street. The public directs their causes as 
they organize and advocate openly for those issues, which includes their discrepancies 
with the role of government. 
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For another active member of the “street”, Sally, she is heavily involved in the 
organization of “initiatives” or informal groups of individuals who want to make a 
difference in society. These individuals nearly all met because of the revolution, the 
social movement that connected the majority of youth throughout the country. She co-
founded an organization that has grown from single digits to nearly five thousand 
members, as they actively participate and organize youth workshops, in multiple 
governorates, that seek to empower, increase civic engagement, as well as spread 
awareness of individual rights. A main concern for them is location to meet, where is a 
safe place to organize when you know public organization will receive the attention of 
the authorities. So what they do is contact accredited NGOs that are willing to host their 
events and meetings, serving as an incubator or protective umbrella, in order to 
legitimatize their gatherings. As a true member of civil society, Sally has her reasons for 
engaging committing herself with ‘initiatives’, citing the lack in government oversight for 
their success. I asked her, as an informal organization, how they are able to avoid 
government regulation that would surely damage their work, she replied by saying: 
 
“Not only that we don’t accept money but also because most of our members are 
not full time free to help managing and directing. We have all of us involved in 
other work, traveling or something; we want something to be a lifestyle- to 
volunteer two hours per week at least. Instead of just sitting and doing nothing, 
we can sit together and do something.” 
 
She responds by saying that they avoid government, firstly by not directly accepting 
funding, so in the case that they are in need of funds, they allow their incubator 
organization to accept on their behalf. Also, they are not tied down to any NGO, as they 
are willing and ready to move their meetings and events to anywhere else willing to host 
them without restrictions. Additionally, all the members are volunteers and 
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simultaneously maintain their careers in order to sustain their extra-curricular activities as 
an initiative. Then Sally said something that had a profound affect on me: “it should 
never by this difficult to do something positive for your community.” This statement 
correctly sums up the frustrations of millions of Egyptian youth that are interested and 
willing to work hard for the development of society but recognize the social and political 
roadblocks that discourage them to do so. These individuals are not the civil society 
members that reap the benefits of policy that supports civil society and are not recognized 
by government as legitimate. They are politically engaged, actively question 
government’s role in society, and they are not civil society actors that are empowered by 
an external power, they did it all on their own by promoting all members to be active 
leaders.      
The activists discussed in this section are reminiscent of the grassroots CSOs that 
had always been used to describe CSOs in theory or principle. However, they are not the 
beneficiaries of support and because of their ‘informal’ status, are not technically 
considered to be a part of civil society, according to the national government, foreign 
governments, as well as by much of the NGO sector. There is something fundamentally 
wrong when genuine civil society actors are labeled as threats to national security, while 
supposed formal organizations receive funding and support for not actually playing their 
role as active and influential members of civil society. And for those organizations that 
do want to have an active role in putting pressure on government, they will receive the 
most regulation and the least support because their projects and funding will not receive 
government approval. This section reveals that activists, or members of “the street”, are 
politically engaged and at the same time have the least government interactions. They see 
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government as a road block to progress and will work with as many organizations or 
people as possible to affectively advocate their message to political society. 
 
Thinking about the Vertical Topography of power: Introduction of the 
Civil Society Model  
 
The earlier sections of analysis provided interviews and research outlined to reach 
a general consensus of what civil society is in Egypt and whether it provides the 
necessary social, political, and economic development that one comes to expect from the 
democratization process. Using the research results and narratives of social forces of the 
state, I will now present and discuss the necessary concerns with the recent thought and 
literature of the “state” and “civil society” using a vertical topography of power as well as 
why there must be a re-conceptualization of state-society relations. Following this 
discussion will be an introduction to a civil society model that provides an insight into 
civil society dynamics in Egypt.  
James Ferguson’s piece, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order 
presents the African context and backdrop for the need of distinguishing the role of civil 
society within the state and the differences between theoretical interpretations and the 
way it is practiced in the “real world”. Recent academics in the realm of political science, 
anthropology, and other humanity studies utilize a vertical topography of power in order 
to understand state and civil society dynamics. This vertical topography of power, 
mentioned previously, describes and displays the power dynamics within the nation-state, 
implying that the “all-powerful and encompassing state” is at the top of the scale with the 
“family” as Ferguson puts it, on the bottom, with a sandwich layering of various 
institutions. The topography of power also vividly describes the appearance of a top-
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down approach by the state as it intervenes with the “bottom”, the villages, the homes, 
and the family.  This belief relies on civil society being the ‘in-between’ space within the 
state, below government and above the family. The neoliberal approach to “state and 
society” and movement for nation building and creating a world order that relies on the 
universal laws of man, citizenship, and state, is one of the factors for ushering in civil 
society. As Ferguson explains, “State-success, by contrast, means the construction of new 
bases of authority resting on nation-state citizenship. Above the national level, finally, 
appears the international, understood largely as (1) a source of “aid,” a helping hand in 
nation-building; and (2) a utopian image of the union of nation-states, with the key 
symbol of the United Nations as the promise of the universality of the nation form (cf. 
Malkki 1994).” A successful state can only be successful when and if the global 
community shows an endorsement, and this is made clear when a the nation that is in fact 
strengthening state capacity is, (1) prescribed by global institutions such as the UN, IMF, 
and World Bank, as well as (2) being a proud recipient of “aid” that will bring 
development and eventually bring any nation up to universal standards. 
The nation building approach by the state itself, has, as Ferguson describes it, 
created this “new paradigm in the study of African politics in the 1980’s” that firstly, 
discovers the local base as a prime location for civil society, and secondly, that the 
“state” (with its economic, political, military, and societal suffocation and domination) is 
actually the main obstacle for democratization and development. The state has since been 
recognized as an obstacle for change, or an entity too big to change the lives of the local. 
The local is now perceived as no longer incapable, as tribal, backward, (or whatever 
typical colonial rhetoric that demonizes the “other”) and whatever tribal tendencies the 
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local population were committed to then are now understood as community organizing, 
grass root organizations, as opposition, as the new class of civil society set to tango with 
the state for more space and eventually for increases in societal progress- Ferguson 
exclaims, “For the state-and-society paradigm sees development not as the project of a 
developmentalist state, but as a societal process that is held back by the stifling hold of 
the state” (Ferguson, 2007: 97). While it seems that the state is in fact a major obstacle 
for democratization and development, the misconception of civil society representing ‘the 
local’, opposition, or grassroots organizations must be elaborated on. Civil society has 
become a major recipient of foreign “aid” as it is constructed to appear to be something 
that it is not.  In Africa’s post-colonial context, the African state re-admits former 
colonial powers into the state as development advisors, diplomatic professionals, and the 
role models of civility. 
I will proceed by making a few points regarding the controversial nature of the 
vertical topography of power in the “developing” nation context of Egypt. 
Firstly, it implies that the state (government) is an all-encompassing force that rules from 
above and holds ultimate power. This is not the case when there is a heavy presence of 
foreign government development agencies, WB, IMF, as well as the plethora of INGOs. 
Secondly, it is implied that the “Bottom” is made up of grass-roots organizations, which 
represent the local and should be empowered to challenge state hegemony and hold 
governance accountable. Thirdly, the vertical topography of power states that everything 
in between the state and the family is civil society- the place where state and people can 
meet, discuss, and initiate action. There has to be a distinction and differentiation 
between the “sandwiched” space between the “top” and “bottom” as my research has 
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shown, civil society is not simply one area of democratic space. There are levels of the 
supposed civil society sector that signify major disconnections between CSOs. For 
instance, transnational organizations have bilateral agreements with government and 
therefore work side by side with the state. This counters the assumption that the state was 
on the “top”, when in fact transnational organizations and foreign governments either 
work on the same level of the state, carrying out similar if not the same functions as 
government, and in some cases work above the state.  In a complete contrast, there are 
grassroots organizations that are not registered, are not legal, are not considered civil 
society (at least when it comes to policy and funding) yet work to advocate and promote 
individual rights while holding government accountable. Rather than an existing space 
where these levels can associate and work together, the space is divided, with clear 
distinctions of “level of power”. What I am suggesting is that 1.) The vertical topography 
of power does not indicate various levels of power- including showing that supposed 
CSOs work on the same level as the state, as Ferguson suggested, and that the topography 
of power should include a ladder- indicating rungs of power. 2.) Just as Ferguson 
proclaimed, verticality should be transformed into a horizontal topography that more 
precisely presents the “real” power dynamics of the state. 
Transforming the vertical topography of power into a “horizontal ladder” is 
necessary for showing the various levels of power between the “state” and the “family” 
as well as presenting the argument that transnational and government organizations work 
on the same level as the “state”. The rungs of the ladder indicate the levels within civil 
society, showing a lack of connection between civil society actors and grassroots 
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organizations, while showing the closeness between certain civil society actors and 
government. 
What this analysis and “horizontal ladder” ultimately provides and indicates is 
research that is consistent with several major discrepancies of Egyptian civil society. 
When it comes to INGOs they are confused as to whether they are a part of civil society 
while some claim they are very much a part of the sector. They are funded by foreign 
governments and work only with legitimate local NGOs that are government approved 
and regulated, disconnecting them from much of civil society.  Foreign government 
entities and their affiliates are directed and funded by a foreign government agenda that 
wants to exert influence over the country. They work with INGOs, government, 
legitimate local NGOs and private industry, basically strengthening political society with 
socio-economic aid. They work close enough to the state level that, besides differences in 
nationality, you could hardly distinguish who is who. There are local NGOs that receive 
funding from local and foreign government, are highly regulated, and mostly intervene 
within the socio-economic realm while paying little attention to political development. 
These organizations are sustained by USAID and other foreign funding as long as there 
are shared interests over a developmental issue. These dominating forces either claim to 
be civil society or claim to empower the sector, although interestingly, none of the 
previously mentioned forces work for political development nor do they engage with 
broader civil society forces to hold government accountable and apply pressure (trade 
unions, grassroots organizations, advocacy groups, activists, initiatives). This leaves us 
with the activists, the ‘street’, and leaders of initiatives who all receive little to zero 
funding internally or externally. They have little to zero contact with INGOs or USAID 
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while their contact with local NGOs is limited, mostly because local NGOs deal with 
short term economic issues such as charity and do not involve themselves in the political 
realm. This group includes what may appear to be the civil society seen so often in 
contemporary literature. They are politically active and engaged individuals, they 
advocate for issues that are central to average Egyptians and they willingly challenge the 
state and their security forces. However, these groups of active citizens are not formally 
considered civil society and therefore are not the beneficiaries of the millions of dollars 
that is committed to civil society by transnational organizations and foreign governments. 
Next to be introduced is an original civil society model that is intended to bring to 
light the nature of Egyptian civil society and the roles of CSOs.  The model uses a 
horizontal approach placing CSOs on a scale of political activity. At the same time the 
model will indicate the international and local nature of these organizations. This is an 
attempt to show the level of political activity by CSOs while simultaneously showing 
whether an organization is “local” or “foreign”. This model is different than the 
“horizontal ladder”, inspired by Ferguson and Dr. Bartlett, because it does not present the 
state’s topography of power. 
CSO Model 
Less Local   INGOs                              Grassroots ‘informal’ CS     More Local 
 
 
 
 
Less Political    Local NGOs                           More Political 
 
 
The model indicates several aspects concerning civil society actors. Firstly, there 
is a trend that shows that the more an individual or group of civil society is political the 
more local they happen to be. As civil society actors become less local there is an 
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inclination to be less political and therefore not fulfilling the necessary functions of civil 
society in theory.  Foreign government donors who provide socio-economic aid do not 
involve themselves within “national politics” and therefore do not promote political 
development; they are at the same time the least political and the most international. 
International and local NGOs are similarly limited in their political nature however they 
obviously differ when it comes to their origins, one is less local and the other more local. 
Initiatives, activists, the “street” happens to be the most political and the most local, 
giving way to the idea that grassroots organizations are the most “local” and 
“indigenous” while having the most interest in challenging state hegemony.  What can 
also be included in this diagram is the revolutionary social movement that led to the 
ousting of former President Mubarak. They represent a large bloc of the “local” that is the 
most politically engaged and interested in challenging governance. 
The results of this model and research show that the formal space for civil society 
is a completely dried up arena with little political activity (the hallmark of civil society 
actors). Formal local or international organizations will not rock the boat, will do limit 
government questioning because they work often work side by side with them, ensuring 
limited political activity. They have limited interaction with active organizations, and are 
more or less perpetuating the status quo and allowing the same power structure of 
authoritarian rule. However, underneath the dried up arena of “formal” civil society, 
which offers little hope for challenging the “political”, there lays a vibrant, active, and 
fertile arena for CSO’s on the “ground” that listen to the heartbeat of the street. This civil 
society is either ignored by the state and by the majority of the “formal” arena or seen as 
a threat to state hegemony.  
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Political Cartoons: Post-
Revolution 
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Ex President Mubarak (right) and ex Field Marshall Tantawi (left) 
 
Tantawi says, “Why don’t you leave already?” 
 
Mubarak says, “Why just me?” 
 
December 26, 2011 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm 
 
 
“They took Aldo (police) and brought 
Shaheen (army)” 
 
Note the one hand with the police and two 
hands bringing the army. 
This is in reference to the supposed ‘external’, 
foreign hand that the government claims to 
have been involved in the revolution. 
 
December 26, 2011 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm 
 
 
 
“Oh gosh, I forgot the name of the guy 
I came to vote for” 
 
In reference to lack of education and 
individuals that were paid to vote 
during elections 
 
May 16, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al 
Youm 
 
 
The Martyrs (angels) of the January 
25th revolution speaking with the 
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Martyrs from clashes on Mohamed Mahmoud Street 
 
“Ha ha you look new, I feel bad. Who’s going to get you your rights? They haven’t 
brought our rights (truth) yet” 
 
December 26, 2011 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm 
 
 
 
Ministry of Interior asks for return of 
the emergency law 
 
Monster is Emergency Law 
Zookeeper (army) says, “Look at this 
refined animal, aren’t you 
embarrassed from being so harsh on 
him?”  
 
September 3, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al 
Youm 
 
 
Headline: After Morsi’s latest decisions 
 
Security says, “He’s telling you go and 
buy him new suits because the old ones 
don’t fit him anymore”  
 
In reference to President Morsi’s 
transformation being in a position of 
power- Morsi is flexing 
 
August 14, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al 
Youm 
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Man flips coin for Egypt’s future, “heads 
or tails (religious or civil)” 
 
Man catches the coin with the face of the 
army on it: “I should have predicted the 
results on my own” 
 
May 17, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al 
Youm 
 
 
 
 
 
Law written to reconcile with 
investors was amended 
 
Rich businessmen walk out of jail 
with their money and say bye to 
military (in reference to deals made 
with them) 
Rich man flips a coin to the poor 
man, “here, splurge on yourself” 
 
May 17, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry 
Al Youm 
 
 
 
 
Army general checking his eye 
sight 
Letters spell ‘revolution’  
 
Army general does not see 
‘revolution’ and only sees 
handcuffs 
 
June 7, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry 
Al Youm 
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A women in parliament is 
asking to cancel the law 
against harassment 
 
Women hold sign that says, 
“No to harassment of women, 
whether alive or dead (in 
reference to the proposed law 
to allow men to sleep with 
their wives within eight hours 
of their death)” 
 
One woman asks, “She 
doesn’t have sisters?” 
 
May 17, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al 
Masry Al Youm 
 
 
 
 
“Go ahead and vote, 
finish this already. The 
meal is waiting for the 
oil, the rice, and the gas 
tank” 
 
In reference to the 
necessity for a president 
as there continues to be 
limited supplies for staple 
products 
 
May 17, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: 
Al Masry Al Youm 
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Four papers read: 1) Morsi the 
Brave, 2) Morsi who embarrassed 
Iran, 3) Morsi is inspired by God, 4) 
Raise your head high, you are 
Morsi! (In reference to the well-
known chant: Raise your heads high, 
you are Masry (Egyptian)) 
 
Man in the middle proclaims, “I 
know we are not an Industrial 
nation, but our line of production of 
pharaohs is going very well”  
 
 
 
 
September 3, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al-
Shorouk 
 
Morsi before his presidency: 
“There is no pencil that will lose 
it’s lead in my era” 
 
Morsi tells the beaten man: “the 
most important thing is that the 
pencil is ok?” 
 
August 14, 2012 
Private daily newspaper: Al 
Masry Al Youm 
 
 
 
Police officer says, “you stole 
laundry and you want to get out 
for free, why? Do you think you 
are the killer of the 
demonstrators?”  
 
In reference of the acquittals for 
police officers responsible for the 
death of protesters 
 
June 7, 2012 Private daily 
newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm 
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Discussion: 
 
 In this section I make the necessary connections between the literature and 
research in order to discuss the results as well as their implications on both civil society 
literature, civil society under authoritarian rule and specifically Egyptian civil society. It 
is important to gather all of these thoughts, the literature, and research to discuss the 
recurring themes of this complex sector.  
What does the literature show?  
  
 The literature provides a necessary background for the principles, purpose and 
role of the state and civil society. Without reviewing the classical definitions and 
interpretations of the state and civil society, let’s first discuss the transformation of state 
and civil society from the “nation-building” to the “state-society” paradigm. The “nation-
building” process understands the state as being the ultimate constructor of the modern 
nation state. The “state” is seen as a modern, highly rational, system of territorial 
organization while “society” is backwards, unorganized, and incapable. The “state” on 
the national level is a centralized authority that rules its citizens within the state, 
emphasizing the importance of requiring citizenship throughout society. The “state” is an 
enabler of democracy and can develop their nation with the help of aid from the 
international community. In the state-society paradigm the roles are reversed. The image 
now depicts the “state” as backwards, unorganized, and incapable of providing the space 
for society to flourish and ultimately develop the nation.  “Society” on the other hand is 
seen as a place for investment or new possibilities because of the overbearing rule of the 
state in the socio-economic and political spheres.  The “local”, once understood as 
backward and rural, are now seen as enablers, dynamic, and held back by “state” power. 
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It is at this point where civil society officially becomes relevant, as a “buzz” word, for 
describing various social movements and the societal struggle against authoritarian 
regimes towards the end of the Cold War era. Civil society has since become nearly 
synonymous with “democracy” and has taken on the role of being an enabler for 
democratic principles.   
The previous decades show that the Western academic world is certainly content 
with the simplistic understanding that civil society is solely a voluntary, grassroots, and 
dynamic sector of society that is needed to challenge and apply pressure on the state. 
Research has since been dedicated towards the work of civic organizations with the rise 
in social movements proving that the state needed to be rolled back. In terms of funding 
with “development” and “aid”, these dynamics have also changed along with the 
evolution of state and civil society. “Development” is seen in both paradigms, going from 
being the project of the state to a natural social process that is actually thwarted by the 
overbearing rule of the state. The belief that the state disables development along with the 
growing support for civil society by academia and transnational organizations (UN, WB, 
and IMF) is made evident by the creation of pro-civil society policies and the allocation 
of funds towards these policies. Development has now become an industry, made up of a 
network of international non-governmental organizations, transnational organizations and 
corporations that work to implement development projects in nations willing to undergo 
the neoliberal process (structural adjustment programs). Civil society has since become a 
major focal point for development agencies and is generally the target audience for the 
industry to fund and ultimately empower.  Civil society has been funded and supported 
for years in nations worldwide, using the key terms of civic engagement and NGO 
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capacity building, and it is clearly seen as a key to democratization and applying pressure 
on the state. However, how close is civil society in reality to the civil society that is so 
actively discussed and written about in Western academia and government policy?  
 The following section will highlight and discuss the research findings for my 
questioning of Egyptian civil society in an attempt to provide the reality of state-society 
relations for Egypt and other authoritarian states in the “developing” world.  
What did the research find?  
 
Research consisted of interviews conducted with the major social forces of 
society. These social forces were namely, local NGOs, international NGOs, USAID and 
development contractors, as well as activists that work on the “street” level. The 
interview process consisted of several questions regarding civil society, with a few key 
questions wondering what each interviewee thought of civil society in Egypt, their 
definition, and their organization’s interaction with government. While civil society is 
often understood as a dynamic network of grassroots, voluntary, actors only the activists 
and their informal organizations function as the civil society as we have come to 
understand. My research has therefore concluded that civil society in Egypt is not what it 
seems in Western academia and government policy.  
Local NGOs are heavily regulated by government and therefore are mostly 
involved in the socio-economic sphere, avoiding the political realm altogether in fear of 
receiving negative attention from government. Their attention is focused on health, 
educational services, and charity, mostly in the form of short-term humanitarian aid. 
These organizations receive funding from both government and foreign aid sources in the 
form of transnational organizations and foreign government aid. Not only are all funds 
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regulated and accounted for, projects are also subject to regulation and therefore have to 
compliment the agenda of both national government and other donors. Still, not all local 
NGOs are lucky enough to receive enough funding to sustain themselves and ultimately 
are forced to alter their work according to the agendas of donors or, they cease to exist. 
These organizations are at the helm of government and are unable to inspire long-term 
development that can roll government back.  
International NGOs are not subjected to quite as much government control 
although funding and development projects are still regulated. Their work is also focused 
in the socio-economic sphere although projects may indirectly affect their constituent’s 
political development. INGOs work closely with certain local NGOs however the local 
organizations must be legitimate according to the government and therefore are heavily 
regulated. The government must approve of projects and funding as well as which local 
organizations are involved. Some of the interviewees believed INGOs to be a part of 
Egyptian civil society while others believed they were catalysts for civil society; certainly 
there was an overall confusion. INGOs work with a long-term development agenda but 
ultimately are forced to work within the limitations of government. Both local and 
international NGOs work outside the political realm and are unable to create enough 
space for civil society to have a broad effect on society, no thanks to government control.  
USAID and development contractors, who clearly are not members of Egyptian 
civil society still fund CSO’s and have an effect on Egyptian society. USAID is 
American foreign aid paid to developing nations by American taxpayers and brought to 
national governments and organizations by way of the State Department. Millions of 
dollars are allocated for civil society in Egypt as the U.S. government hopes to support 
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democratization in the Arab Republic. However, funding is either delivered to the 
Egyptian government who therefore can decide which organizations to provide funds, or, 
to INGOs that will ultimately utilize funding for their project partnerships with local 
NGOs. In both scenarios funding is provided to organizations that are highly regulated, 
that will not use the funds for challenging governance, and that are seen as legitimate by 
government. Additionally, USAID projects are bilateral nearly seventy percent of the 
time, as they work hand in hand with the Egyptian government. The U.S. ultimately is 
interested in Egypt’s stability as their interests in the region depend on it. Stability in 
Egypt means supporting organizations that will rarely or never question governance or 
the status quo.  
Activists on the other hand serve a much different purpose than the previously 
mentioned forces of society. Of the four individuals that were interviewed, all of them are 
involved in informal organizations, work voluntarily, occasionally involve themselves 
with local NGOs but are weary of their capabilities, have limited to zero contact with 
INGOs or foreign governmental aid, and consider themselves to be affiliated with social 
justice issues focused on improving governance. One woman is involved in an informal 
organization called an “initiative” that voluntarily brings together young leaders with 
likeminded beliefs who want to develop society’s awareness and activity but specifically 
want to avoid government controlled NGOs and development agencies. Even receiving 
funding from abroad, whether it be from USAID, the EU, or Qatar, is looked down upon 
for fear that their image will be tainted in the eyes of the people. Most of these 
individuals met during the Egyptian Revolution on January 25th 2011 and believe the 
government to be a roadblock to their efforts. The work these individuals take part in is 
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“pure civil society”, the definition seen in contemporary literature, which is a grassroots 
effort to rally and organize large numbers of the population to put pressure and challenge 
government’s overbearing authority.  
What the results prove is that there is a dominant, formal, public, official, and 
legitimatized civil society that is promoted by transnational organizations, a dense 
network of INGOs, Western academics and government policy, that has turned out to the 
opposite purpose of what civil society should strive for. This civil society is not the 
dynamic, bustling, innovative and grass root sector of society that will push forward 
efforts for democratization in Egypt.  This civil society is regulated by an authoritarian 
regime, often works closely with government, and still receives millions of dollars 
specifically geared towards various elements of democratization.  Using the funds of 
external governments and affiliate transnational organizations like the WB and IMF, this 
public imposter we know as civil society cooperates with the national government of 
Egypt to impose Western development and neoliberal policies. While this paper does not 
specifically question the intentions of the neoliberal agenda, it is astonishing that the 
Egyptian government pre and post revolution comfortably receives funding though there 
are is no indication that governance has improved domestically. In fact, the country has 
slowly worsened due to the lethal combination of structural adjustment programs and 
unemployment that culminated with an uprising that dethroned the former president in 
2011. With the current President Morsi the same domestic problems linger and yet there 
seems to lack the necessary inner questioning by transnational organizations of their own 
funding and appear willing to continue the same development practices as was agreed 
with the previous regime.   
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The research also proves is that there is an underground, informal civil society 
that is dynamic, organized, and grassroots, similar to the civil society described by 
academics and government policy. It turns out that informal civil society is not weak, 
small or incapable, only weakened by the fact that they are not legitimate due to the 
nature of their work and therefore receive little in funding or support from national or 
foreign governments. Furthermore, they are considered by government sympathizers to 
be “the opposition”, the “tyrants of the revolution” the backwards “other” that is 
destabilizing the nation. With all of this applied pressure, the proof of their strength is 
clearly evident by the results of the revolution, with turnouts of over a million strong, the 
use of well-practiced nonviolent tactics against an armed and equipped security force and 
the current mobilizing activity on the ground against the new Morsi regime.  
 The research is consistent with the domestic issues that have plagued the Arab 
Republic over the past decades. There has been a visible “public” civil society promoting 
policies that were government regulated within the same timeframe that have not resulted 
in democratizing the state, in fact, the military dictatorship had been hardly impenetrable 
up until the uprising that saw millions of Egyptians call for an end to despotic, 
aristocratic rule. “Informal” civil society instead decided to take development into their 
hands, as the revolution may be the greatest attempt at a social and political revolution in 
modern Egyptian history, without the help of ‘formal’ civil society.  
Implications: 
 
What are the implications of these state dynamics for the African and Middle 
Eastern context? What first must be recognized is the disparity between civil society in 
the “developing” world in comparison with the “developed”.  
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Funding should not be guaranteed to authoritarian governments with little interest 
in real democracy. These funds actually strengthen “formal” civil society, which 
ultimately acts to strengthen stability in government rather than alter their deeply flawed 
mode of governance. Leakages of aid facilitate corruption, allowing government to 
support and allocate funds to whichever organization they approve all the while the 
power dynamics, status quo, and the state’s involvement continues as it always had been. 
Continued support towards “formal” civil society simultaneously strengthens government 
while weakening “informal” civil society. Civil society in “developing” nations becomes 
a tool for both external and internal manipulation. It is a tool for the state as they can 
regulate “change” for Egypt, ensure political power remains stable and create the 
appearance of “development” by allowing NGOs to exist but with heavy regulations and 
control over their work and effectiveness. All at the same time promoting 
“democratization” by allowing transnational organizations and Western government to 
play a major role within its development process. It is utilized by external forces 
(transnational organizations and international government) because Egypt becomes 
westernized, can shape and remodel the nation according to neo-liberal policies, can 
bring Egypt into a global economy, can ensure western interests are intact, and allows a 
certain degree of control over the state. All at the same time promoting democracy and 
socio-economic development though not questioning governance, creating space for 
“informal” civil society, or applying pressure for real, tangible political development. 
“Informal” CSOs continue to grow where civil society is the purest, in the street. 
The Egyptian street, commonly regarded as the bustling birthplace for the revolution, is 
the site of where every day trials and tribulations are most evident. The street is where 
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acquaintances become friends, for transactions to be made, and where the majority of the 
population spends its time struggling to survive. Nevertheless, “informal” civil society 
has a lot of intended and unintended enemies, none more daunting than the government 
apparatus. This sector applies pressure nearly daily, as there are protests and campaigns 
that are organized in public squares with the intention of creating awareness and 
promoting democratic principles through an outreach method unparalleled by ‘formal’ 
CSOs.  
The dynamics of power within the state should be more closely scrutinized as 
civil society continues to be misinterpreted by its leading promoters. “Formal” civil 
society may be capable of re-writing their fate by developing new methods of outreach to 
informal CSOs in an attempt to further their understanding of society. If their government 
counterparts do not approve, then the necessary job of holding the Egyptian national 
government accountable for not allowing the seeds of democracy to grow will be 
addressed on a state level. If government does not approve and no longer appreciates the 
work of ‘formal’ civil society, then they can step aside for ‘informal’ civil society to 
regain this space and legitimately challenge the imperious rule of government. Either 
support “informal” CSOs, pure civil society, with the necessary funding or get out of 
their way and allow them to regain space from political society in the grassroots, dynamic 
manner it is supposed to serve and develop Egyptian society.  
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APPENDIX I:  
(NGO Law 84, 2002 is not available online) Legal Analysis According to The 
International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL):  
 
“Organizational Forms 
Law 84 of 2002 allows for the creation of associations, foundations (i.e, non-
governmental institutions), and unions.  In addition, not-for-profit companies can be 
established by virtue of provisions in the Egyptian Civil Code and Corporate Code. 
According to Law 84 of 2002, an association is a “group with a formal structure 
continuing for a definite or indefinite period and formed by natural or juridical persons, 
or both together, whose number is not less than ten in all cases, for a purpose other than 
gaining physical profit.”  (Article 1) 
A foundation or non-governmental institution is established where a fund is designated 
for a definite or indefinite period of time, for the realization of a purpose other than 
profit.  (Article 56) 
[The remainder of this report will focus on associations, as the association is 
overwhelmingly the most common organizational form.] 
Public Benefit Status 
Associations pursuing “general interest” purposes may be recognized as “associations of 
public benefit” by presidential decree, upon the request of the association or of the 
government-controlled General Union for Associations and Non-Governmental 
Institutions (Foundations).  (Articles 48, 49)  The criteria for attaining public benefit 
status are not clearly defined and the President’s decision not clearly guided by objective 
standards. According to Article 49: 
All association visualizing the realization of a general interest upon or after its 
foundation may be vested with the quality of public benefit, by decree of the President of 
the Republic, upon the request of the association, or of the administrative authority or the 
General Union for Associations and Non-Governmental Institutions, and the approval of 
the association in both cases. 
According to Article 51 of Law 84 of 2002, public benefit organizations have access to 
direct government funding.  In practice, many public benefit organizations have close 
political links to the ruling party or President.  
Barriers to Entry 
Law 84 of 2002 includes of a number of legal barriers to the establishment of 
associations. First, the law requires that all associations be registered in order to operate; 
in other words, informal [unregistered] associations are prohibited.  Second, the law 
includes vague grounds for denial of registration, thereby inviting subjective and arbitrary 
government decision-making. Registration can be refused if the association’s purposes 
“threaten the national unity” or run “against public order and public attitude." As 
demonstrated recently, the Ministry has used these grounds to deny registration; the 
associations Egyptians against Discrimination and Old Egyptians for Human Rights were 
denied registration in January 2008 and May 2009, respectively.  Third, many 
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international NGOs seeking to establish branch offices in Egypt have faced great 
difficulty in doing so. 
Barriers to Operational Activity 
Barriers to operational activity in Egypt take the form of governmental interference in 
internal affairs, vague grounds for dissolution, the imposition of harsh sanctions, and 
extra-legal harassment by security authorities. 
First, Law 84 of 2002 expressly authorizes the Government to interfere in the internal 
affairs of associations. Specifically: 
• The administrative authority has the right to call a General Assembly meeting 
(Article 25); 
• The association must send a copy of the papers tabled before the General Assembly 
to the administrative authority at least 15 days before convening the Assembly 
(Article 26); 
• The association must provide the administrative authority with a copy of the minutes 
of the General Assembly meeting within 30 days from the meeting (Article 26); 
• The Minister of Social Affairs may appoint acting members of the Board of 
Directors where there are insufficient members to hold a meeting (Article 40); 
• The Minister may also dissolve the board of directors if the board has not convened 
a meeting of the General Assembly for two consecutive years (Article 42).  
Second, the law includes vague grounds for dissolution, thereby inviting subjective and 
arbitrary decision-making on dissolution decisions.  Vague grounds include: 
• Subscribing to or joining any club, organization, society or authority outside Egypt 
without first information the administrative authority; and 
• Threatening the national unity or public order or public attitude.  
Third, Egyptian law makes harsh sanctions – including imprisonment – available for 
violations of the law. Conducting activities as an unregistered association, conducting 
activities that threaten the national unity, and receiving foreign funds without prior 
governmental approval are all examples of violations that could lead to the imposition of 
sanctions, including imprisonment. 
Finally, the security apparatus in Egypt is infamous for interfering with associational 
activity. 
Barriers to Speech / Advocacy 
Egyptian law prohibits all “political activities” of NGOs.  Regulations indicated that 
prohibited political activities include “advocating the program of one of the political 
parties, contributing to electoral campaigns, and putting forth candidates for office.” 
(Regulations to Law No. 84/2002 on Associations and Non-Governmental Institutions 
(Article 25)).  The Egyptian Government, however, does not distinguish between a 
political campaign for office and public policy activities. One example is the case of the 
Egyptian Association Against Torture.  The Administrative Judiciary Court refused to 
register the association on December 15, 2005 because the court decided that the group’s 
mission to pressure the government to eliminate torture in police stations and prisons was 
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“political activity”; consequently, the association was prohibited from launching its 
activities. 
Criminal defamation is also used to silence critics of Egypt’s Government.  Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, one Egypt’s leading human rights and democracy activists, was arrested, 
prosecuted and imprisoned in 2000 for, among other things, allegedly “defaming Egypt’s 
image abroad” – a violation of the Egyptian Criminal Code.  His defense team claimed 
that the real motive behind the Government’s prosecution was his outspoken criticism of 
President Hosni Mubarak and his administration.  Mr. Ibrahim was tried three times but 
ultimately acquitted by the High Court of Justice in 2003 after substantial international 
pressure was exerted on the Mubarak regime.  Several years later, a series of hisba 
lawsuits* were brought against Mr. Ibrahim by individual Egyptian citizens, and on 
August 2, 2008, and Egyptian court sentenced Ibrahim to tow years imprisonment for 
again “defaming Egypt,” this time under the hisba doctrine.  At least a dozen additional 
hisba cases remain pending against Mr. Ibrahim. 
Barriers to International Contact 
Egyptian law requires advance Ministry approval in order to join any organization or 
society headquartered outside of Egypt. Egyptian authorities may prevent individuals 
(including association representatives and civil society activists) from travelling outside 
Egypt to participate in international conferences and meetings. Authorities may also 
prevent representatives of international organizations from entering Egypt.  
Barriers to Resources 
Foreign Funding 
Egyptian law prohibits any association from receiving foreign funds – whether from 
foreign individuals or from foreign authorities (including their representatives inside 
Egypt) – without advance approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity.  Securing 
ministerial approval may require a two-month wait during which time the Ministry 
reviews the request for approval.  The failure to secure approval can lead to 
dissolution.  For example, on April 27, 2009, the Egyptian Organization for Human 
Rights (EOHR) received a dissolution decree, alleging that the EOHR received foreign 
funding without authorization; the dissolution order reportedly came soon after EOHR 
published its 2008 Annual Report, criticizing the Egyptian Government.  It should be 
noted, however, that an Egyptian administrative court found in a prior case involving 
another association that dissolution of an organization based on receipt of foreign funds 
without prior approval is unconstitutional. 
Sending funds from an Egyptian NGO to a natural or legal person abroad also requires 
advance approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, except for scientific and 
technical books, magazine, publications, and brochures. Law 84 applies the same 
sanctions for sending and receiving foreign funding without government approval. 
Domestic Funding 
The barriers against foreign funding also apply to some categories of domestic funding. 
Specifically, the law requires that associations seeking funds from Egyptian individuals 
also secure advance approval from the Ministry.  Presumably, the failure to do so carries 
with it the same risk of dissolution.” 
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